THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

Volume XXXIII, Number 2 JANUARY 1956

BELLARMINE ON *LIBERUM ARBITRIUM*
Rosemary Z. Lauer

LOGIC AND THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES IN ARISTOTLE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
Anthony A. Nemetz

Notes and Discussion, Book Reviews

Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

The Modern Schoolman *is a quarterly journal of philosophy, dedicated to furthering the work begun by the great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.*

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price, $4.00 a year; foreign subscriptions, $4.20 a year (in France, 1550 fr.); single copies, $1.25 each. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is indexed in the *Catholic Periodical Index.* Copyright ©, 1956, by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

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Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office at Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

Printed in the U.S.A. by E. W. Stephens Co., Columbia, Missouri

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BELLARMINE ON *LIBERUM ARBITRIUM*

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In 1576 St. Robert Bellarmine was called from Louvain to Rome to organize a chair of controversy at the Roman College. The lectures which he gave in connection with this position formed the bulk of his *Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus Hujus Temporis Haereticos,* a theological work which contains and presupposes, as does St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica,* an immense amount of philosophical thought. These *Controversies* were published by popular demand, the first volume being printed at Ingolstadt in 1586, the second two years later, and the third and last volume in 1593. In 1596 Bellarmine himself revised the work and had it published at Venice. It is this latter edition, in four volumes, which has been used as a criterion in all subsequent editions. Since the work dealt with the burning theological and philosophical questions of the day and since its author was recognized as an authoritative speaker for the Catholic viewpoint, it was widely read and became a focal point, both on the Continent and in England, for theological and even political argumentation. That the content of the *Controversies* represented something more than a cursory treatment of the day's problems is attested by the fact that some of Bellarmine's enemies refused to believe that it was all the work of one man and attributed it to a "Jesuit phalanx."

It is from the *Disputationes de Controversiis*[1] this this present analysis of Bellarmine's teaching on *liberum arbitrium* is taken.

On a number of occasions in his career Bellarmine was called upon to treat the question of the relation of grace to *liberum arbitrium,* and it is in such a context that his doctrine on the nature of *liberum arbitrium* occurs. The first occasion presented itself during his years

of teaching at Louvain. Michael Baius,[2] a colleague on the staff of Louvain University, was expounding to his classes a doctrine which was peculiarly like that of the Calvinists and Lutherans. Despite a papal condemnation of his teaching, Baius continued unabated, protected by the ambiguous wording of the official document condemning his views.

A listing of a few Baianistic propositions will indicate what Bellarmine had to consider in formulating his own thought in order that he might avoid errors and offer an antidote for the condemned teaching:

First proposition: *Liberum arbitrium* in man has no power of choice, nor does such a power belong to it by reason of its intrinsic and natural *ratio.*

Second proposition: Liberty and necessity are compatible with each other, and only violence is opposed to natural liberty.

Third proposition: *Liberum arbitrium* does not have in its intrinsic *ratio* anything such that it might *de se, in se, ex se,* or *per se* effect a free act.

Fourth proposition: *Liberum arbitrium* can do nothing of itself except sin, and every work issuing from *liberum arbitrium* is either a mortal or a venial sin.

Fifth proposition: A man who does what is within his own power sins, and he cannot fail to sin in doing what is within his own power.

Eighth proposition: *Liberum arbitrium* wills freely whatever it spontaneously or voluntarily wills, but in such a manner that what it wills freely it wills necessarily.[3]

Each of the propositions propounded by Baius has its detailed answer in the *Controversies.* In fact, the space allotted to a refutation

[1]References to the writings of Bellarmine in this article are to *Opera Omnia,* ed. Justinus Fèvre (Paris: Vivès, 1873), 12 vols.

[2]See Nicolas Frizon, S.J., *Vie du cardinal Bellarmin* (Paris: Beaupré Frères, 1827), I, 87-88. Father Frizon remarks, with delightful French satire, that Baius must have been a very learned man, for he was reputed to have read the complete works of St. Augustine—and this not once but nine times.

[3]Michael Baius, *Annotations in Sorbonnae Censuram, Series Theologica,* XXIV, *Opuscula Duo de Doctrina Baiana,* ed. Henry Lennerz, S.J. (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1938), pp. 5-19.

[4]Father Augustine Bea, S.J., of the Gregorian University in Rome, is presently working on the text.

[5]*Auctarium bellarminianum, supplément aux oeuvres du cardinal Bellarmin* (Paris, 1913), p. 88; tr. by James Brodrick, S.J., in *The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Francis Cardinal Bellarmine, S.J.* (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1928), II, 7.

of these errors is so great that the spectre of Baius may easily be discerned throughout most of the work, and this is especially true when Bellarmine comes to treat explicitly of *liberum arbitrium.*

It was while he was lecturing at Louvain that Bellarmine assembled his commentary on St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica;* consequently, we might expect to find in this commentary an important part of Bellarmine's thought on *liberum arbitrium,* and any monograph which does not take this commentary into consideration might very well be considered incomplete. Unfortunately, however, the text is only now in the process of being edited and is not available for consultation.[4] However, the question of *liberum arbitrium* is treated extensively and explicitly in the controversy *De Gratia.* Moreover, since this controversy is included in the edition which the author himself revised in 1596, it may be regarded as containing the more mature and more considered solution of the problem.

A comparison of statements which St. Robert made in 1580 and in 1588 seems to indicate that the opinion expressed in *De Gratia* is not only more mature and more considered than that which he held while at Louvain, but that the later opinion is even entirely different from the earlier one. In 1580 he wrote:

> God's causality is prior in nature to that of the will; yet He moves the will as He foresaw that the will would move itself were it in its power to act independently. This solution saves the freedom of the will, puts God's causality first, and exonerates Him from the responsibility for man's sins . . . One objection against it might be urged, namely that since the will is indeterminate until it acts, God could not foresee clearly how it would act until it had acted. To this it may be replied that the will so determines itself that the determination is an effect of its freedom. Now God's foreknowledge penetrates the human will and sees there *in causa* the various determinations of itself which it will, in due course, bring about. If you say that this makes God depend on man because He will be obliged to act according to my choices, I answer that this is not so, for God decreed from all eternity to move my will according as He foresaw I would move it myself had I a totally independent power of self-determination.[5]

From this it seems that the will determines itself only insofar as God determines it in the manner in which it *would* determine itself *were* it able to exercise an independent power of self-determination. While in 1588 Bellarmine still does not teach that any created cause can operate without the First Cause, he does assign to the will an *actual,* not merely a *hypothetical* power of self-determination:

> . . . *unumquodque recipitur secundum modum et dispositionem recipientis.* Now since this 'modus' and this 'dispositio' are presupposed, plainly they must be considered as in some way prior both to the action of the will and to the motion and influence of God on the will. It is nothing else, then, than a certain negative determination through which the will permits itself to be moved by the object which the intellect presents to it, or through which the will resists, not by acting but by refraining from activity. Such a negative determination can exist apart from any act, and consequently it does not need the influence of God, and is the first root of the will's freedom.[6]

Though the glimmerings of the second opinion may be discerned in the first, there is a real difference between the two, one opinion

[6]Bellarmine, *De Controversia Lovaniensi;* tr. by Brodrick in *Life and Work of Bellarmine,* II, 20. *The De Controversia Lovaniensi* is a report which Bellarmine wrote in defense of Father Lessius and presented to Cardinal Madrucci, Prefect of the Inquisition.

[7]The division was made according to the relative importance assigned to grace and *liberum arbitrium* and dates back at least to the Pelagian heresy combated by St. Augustine. In 1596 those who appeared to be emphasizing grace rather than *liberum arbitrium* were led by Bañez and called themselves "Thomists." The opposition party, to which Bellarmine belonged, did not have an acknowledged leader until Molina published his *De Concordia Gratiae et Liberi Arbitrii* in 1589.

Cf. William R. O'Connor, O.P., "Molina and Bañez as Interpreters of St. Thomas Aquinas," *New Scholasticism,* XXI (July, 1947), 243-59, for an evaluation of Bañez's claim to be a "Thomist."

Because the question was not *whether* man has such a power as free choice, the "reformers" had no part in the debate except indirectly insofar as the "Thomists" were accused by the "Molinists" of being Calvinists or Lutherans because, as the Molinists claimed, the "Thomistic" doctrine retained nothing of *liberum arbitrium* but the expression. Cf. Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,* Lib. IV, cap. v (*Opera,* VI, 14), where he quotes Luther: " 'Liberum arbitrium est figmentum in rebus, et titulus sine re, quia nulli est in manu quippiam cogitare boni vel mali, sed omnia (ut Wiclefi articulus Constantiae damnatus recte docet) de necessitate absoluta eveniunt . . . Non est dubium Satana magistro in Ecclesiam venisse hoc nomen liberum arbitrium.' Hic aperte Lutherus simpliciter tollit liberum arbitrium omnibus in rebus, juxta haeresim Wiclefi, et ideo ipsum etiam nomen liberi arbitrii damnat. Ex quo factum est, ut librum adversus Erasmum inscripserit de servo arbitrio."

[8]Gerard Schneemann, S.J., *Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus* (Fribourg: Herder, 1881), pp. 8-9.

positing a hypothetical power of determination and the other an actual one. This difference is sufficient to warrant the assertion that Bellarmine's final position will not be found in the *Summa* commentary, which was completed even before 1580, and that, while the commentary would be necessary for any exposition of the *development* of his thought, it is not necessary for an examination of his final position.

Long before Bellarmine had revised his *Controversies* in 1596, the "great debate" on the relative roles of grace and *liberum arbitrium* had already divided Catholic theologians into two parties.[7] All agreed, however, on a number of points:

> We acknowledge that there is one almighty God, Lord of all, on Whom all created things depend in their action, by Whom all things are moved to act, and Whose *concursus* is required for all efficient causality whatsoever. We confess that His prevenient grace is necessary for every act meriting salvation, even the very first act and the beginning of faith. We acknowledge that the will cannot assent to grace with its merely natural power, but for this assent the natural power must be affected by grace. We confess that grace moves the soul both morally and physically, as well while it acts as before it acts; that grace not only enlightens the mind, but even stirs up the will; that grace does not only confer the power to perform supernatural acts, but it even effects such acts. We confess that there is an almighty God Who alone commands, not only the things of nature, but also the very souls of men as He wills; that, according as He wills, He inclines and impels them, not, however, in such a way that freedom is impaired or taken away. Instead, under the motion of grace, the ability to assent or dissent still remains.[8]

It was not, then, so much the question of *whether* man has a power of *liberum arbitrium* that concerned St. Robert; it was the need for an explanation of *how liberum arbitrium* can be reconciled with grace. In fact, those who, like Luther, Calvin, and Wycliffe, denied that man has such a power as self-determination did so, at least partly, because there was no satisfactory explanation of the paradox that all

man's supernatural acts are to be attributed entirely to grace but, nevertheless, also to his own will. It is in the light of this question, this need for a reconciliation of two apparently contradictory points of view, that Bellarmine's analysis of *liberum arbitrium* must be examined; and his own unique theory of "negative determination" can be understood clearly only against the background of the famous controversy.

In general, two "solutions" of the paradox were offered.[9] The group with whom Bellarmine had most in common were those who based their explanation on a theory similar to the following:

> Whatever is moved is evidently moved by another, but motion is received according to the mode of the recipient; accordingly a motion imparted by God can be modified either by the properties of things or by the choice of wills, so that the *same* divine motion can be made different either by the properties of the moved things or by free deliberation. Not in the motion imparted by the Creator, therefore, should we posit the whole and complete cause for the production of determinate actions in secondary causes.[10]

[9]See n. 7.

[10]Given by Schneemann in *Controversiarum*, pp. 9-10, as a summary of the "Molinist" doctrine.

[11]*Scholastica Commentaria in Primam D. Thomae*, q. 19, a. 8; quoted by Schneemann in *Controversiarum*, p. 10.

[12]The Latin expression, *liberum arbitrium*, has been retained because the English "free will" is not an exact equivalent, having implications not contained in the Latin and permitting no distinction between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*. The distinction leaves open to discussion the question of whether the freedom involved is that of judgment or that of will.

[13]Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Lib. III, cap. ii (*Opera*, V, 582). The fact that Bellarmine rejects this position on the meaning of *liberum arbitrium* does not imply that he rejects such a thing as a conjunction of intellectual and volitional acts.

[14]*Ibid.*

[15]*Ibid.* Bellarmine cites Peter Lombard as one of the proponents of this position. Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiarum Libri Quatuor* (Paris, 1880), Lib. II, d. 24 (*PL*, Vol. CXCII, col. 702): "Liberum verum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. Et dicitur liberum, quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest. Arbitrium vero, quantum ad rationem, cujus est facultas vel potentia illa, cujus etiam est discernere inter bonum et malum . . ."

[16]Cf. St. Bernard, *Tractatu de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, cap. ii (*PL*, Vol. CLXXXII, col. 1004): "Is ergo talis consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem, et rationis quod secum semper et ubique portat, indeclinabile judicium, non incongrue dicetur, ut arbitror, liberum arbitrium, ipse liber sui propter voluntatem, ipse judex sui propter rationem. Et merito libertatem comitatur judicium: quoniam, quidem quod liberum sui est, profecto ubi peccat, ibi se judicat."

[17]". . . S. Bernardi . . . qui docet, judicium rationis dici liberum, quia libere judicat de actu suae voluntatis" (Bellarmine, *De Gratia*, Lib. III, cap. ii [*Opera*, V, 582]).

The theory which Bellarmine opposed was expressed by Bañez:

> That the power of the first cause is modified by any secondary cause I count to be false . . . Indeed, the divine will modifies everything since it is the most universal and efficacious cause of everything whatsoever, as much with respect to its mode as to its becoming and *esse* . . . The divine will determines itself to the production of every effect, no matter how special, and therefore the active *concursus* of the divine will is not susceptible of modification by any inferior cause.[11]

If these two theories, as well as Bellarmine's personal background are kept in mind throughout the following considerations of what St. Robert meant by *liberum arbitrium*, the conclusions which he reached will be more intelligible, and an appreciation will be gained of how he managed to thread his way through the objections of both sides and arrive at an explanation of *liberum arbitrium* which, defective though it may be, does succeed in maintaining simultaneously that all that is, is from God, and yet man does by himself determine his own will.

Material Signification of Liberum Arbitrium

Adhering to his ordinary procedure of expounding, clarifying, and co-ordinating what has already been written on any subject he is about to consider, St. Robert, in the third book of the controversy *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, begins with a discussion of the meaning which various authors have attributed to the term *liberum arbitrium*.[12] The fact that *arbitrium* may mean either "judgment" or "will" makes possible a division of the field into three principal opposing opinions.

There are those who take the term to mean a conjunction of two acts: a judgment by the reason and an election by the will.[13] That is, the *arbitrium* is an intellectual act conjoined with the will's election, the election having the function of making the conjoined acts free.[14] The result is, then, a judgment with an election or an election with a judgment.[15]

The second opinion is that of St. Bernard,[16] who holds that the term *liberum arbitrium* applies properly to the judgment and that this judgment is free either because the intellect judges freely concerning the act of the will[17] or because the judgment is indifferent to

many things and man judges in doubtful cases, especially concerning particulars, according to the way he wishes to judge.[18]

The third group (*quorum videtur esse optima, verissimaque sententia*)[19] holds that *liberum arbitrium* refers solely to the act of the will,[20] for only the will is truly and properly free. Among this group are numbered St. Thomas, St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and the fathers of the Church, *qui passim ad nomen arbitrii, addunt voluntatis nomen, ac dicunt liberum voluntatis arbitrium.* That is, though *arbitrium* may have for its primary etymological sense the meaning of "judgment," it may very well be adapted to signifying the act of the will; and, that this adaptation be not ambiguous, some of the fathers have expanded the phrase *liberum arbitrium* to *liberum voluntatis arbitrium.*[21]

Adding to this danger of ambiguity is the fact that the will's *election* is, in a certain sense, a *judicium ultimum,*[22] a final decision. However,

[18]". . . tum quia est indifferens ad multa, tum quia in rebus dubiis, ac praesertim in particulari judicamus, ut volumus" (*ibid.*, pp. 582-83).

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 583.

[20]*Ibid.* Bellarmine refers to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 83, a. 3 ad 2. The objection answered by St. Thomas is that *liberum arbitrium* is called a *quasi liberum judicium.* But to judge belongs to a cognitive power. Therefore, *liberum arbitrium* is a cognitive power. St. Thomas replies that counsel is determined by a judgment of reason and also by the consent of the appetite. Consequently, election is a *quoddam judicium,* and from the act of election's being a *quoddam judicium, liberum arbitrium* gets its name. It is difficult to see how Bellarmine drew from this source the conclusion that *liberum arbitrium* signifies *solely* the act of the will: *solius voluntatis actum.*

[21]Cf. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,* cap. ii (*PL,* Vol. XLIV, col. 882): "Revelavit autem nobis per Scripturas suas sanctas, esse in homine liberum *voluntatis* arbitrium" (italics mine).

Cf. also St. Ambrose, *De Fide,* Lib. II, cap. vi (*PL,* Vol. XVI, col. 569). The reference in the Bellarmine text to chapter three is faulty; the passage is found in chapter six. The quotation as given by Bellarmine (*pro libero voluntatis arbitrio*) differs from the Migne text (*pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio*). In his *De Ascensionis Mentis in Deum, Gradus Octavus* (*Opera,* VIII, 276) Bellarmine himself says, "Sexto donata est hominis anima libero *voluntatis* arbitrio . . ." (italics mine).

[22]"Nam electio voluntatis est quasi sententia quaedam et judicium ultimum ipsius voluntatis" (Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. ii [*Opera,* V, 583]). Bellarmine refers here to St. Thomas, *In II Sent.,* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2. It does not seem that St. Thomas calls election a *quasi sententia quaedam et judicium ultimum ipsius voluntatis.* What he seems to say is that the judgment belongs to the will inasmuch as the *virtus rationis* perdures in the will: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamuis iudicium non pertineat ad voluntatem absolute, iudicium tamen electionis, quae tenet locum conclusionis, ad voluntatem pertinet, secundum quam in ea virtus rationis manet" (*Opera Omnia* [Rome, 1570], Vol. VI).

[23]Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. ii (*Opera,* V, 583).

[24]*Ibid.*, cap. iii, p. 583.

[25]*Ibid.*

[26]How intelligence is the *radix libertatis* will be considered in the next section.

it would not be proper to call the election simply a *liberum judicium.* There is this difference between a judge and an arbiter: the judge is confined to rendering decisions according to certain laws, while the arbiter is, in some sense at least, not subject to any law, but is a law to himself.[23] Similarly, if the election were simply an intellectual judgment, it would be subject to certain laws; but, since it is both an intellectual judgment and a decision of the will, as will appear later, election is not altogether subject to law. Accordingly, an intellectual judgment by itself could not be free; therefore, *liberum judicium* is unintelligible and not in any way interchangeable with *liberum arbitrium,* which is applicable only to the will.

Formal Signification of *Liberum Arbitrium*

Having considered the material signification of *liberum arbitrium,* Bellarmine is concerned with formulating an exact definition of the term. The opinions of St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and Peter Lombard are again given consideration; but these are set aside, not as erroneous but as lacking the completeness of St. Thomas's definition. The definition to be expounded and defended, then, is the one *ex doctrina S. Thomae collectam;* namely, *liberum arbitrium est libera potestas ex his, quae ad finem aliquem conducunt, unum prae alio eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi, vel pro arbitrio respuendi, intelligenti naturae ad magnam Dei gloriam attributa.*[24]

Generically, then, *liberum arbitrium* is a potency or a power; the specific difference is the fact that it is free or undetermined.[25] And this freedom or indeterminateness is proper to the will in such a way that no other potency can be said to be free in the same way. The genus *potentia* which freedom specifies, is an accident, for there can be no potency except in a subject. According, then, to the definition of *liberum arbitrium* culled from the teachings of St. Thomas, the subject in which the power resides is indicated by the phrase *intelligenti naturae . . . attributa.* It is only in God, angels, and men that the power of *liberum arbitrium* can reside, and this restriction of the power to intelligent or rational subjects is not due to any arbitrariness on the part of the author of *liberum arbitrium.*[26]

Included also in the definition Bellarmine has undertaken to defend is the object of *liberum arbitrium.* The object can be any one of those things which *ad finem aliquem conducunt.* Not the end, then, but some means to the end is the object of the power, just as deliberation does not bear upon the end, which is determined by the will's nature, but only upon means to this predetermined end.[27] From this distinction of end and object arises the distinction between *voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium. Voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium* are one and the same rational appetitive power; but as this power has respect to the end, it is *voluntas;* as it has respect to means to the end, it is *liberum arbitrium.*[28] An analogous relation is observed in the power of understanding. With respect to first principles, it is called *intellectus;* with respect to conclusions which are arrived at discursively, it is called *ratio.*

The proper act of *liberum arbitrium* is *electio: unum prae alio eligendi, aut unum et idem acceptandi, vel pro arbitrio respuendi.* There can be, therefore, two kinds of election: the choice of one thing rather than another and the voluntary acceptance or rejection of one particular thing when there is no choice between alternatives. The former involves freedom of specification, or *libertas contrarietatis;* the latter, freedom of exercise, or *libertas contradictionis.*[29]

Ad magnam Dei gloriam is the end for which man is endowed with *liberum arbitrium.* However, because the arguments used to establish

[27]"Consultatio autem omnis est de mediis ad finem, non de ipso fine" (*ibid.*, p. 584). (The credit for ending a paragraph with a comma belongs neither to the present writer, nor, surely, to Bellarmine. Perhaps the error has occurred *prae festinatione vel aliorum.* See Brodrick, *Life and Work of Bellarmine,* I, 174, for an interesting sidelight on Bellarmine and *errores typographorum.*)

[28]Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. iii (*Opera,* V, 584). Cf.: "Sexto, objicitur testimonium S. Thomae, qui in quaest. 10, de potentia art. 2 ad 5, scribit, solam coactionem repugnare naturali libertati voluntatis. Respondeo: loquitur eo loco S. Thomas de voluntate simplici, non de voluntate, ut est principium electionis, quae sola liberum arbitrium nominatur. Adde, quod videtur idem auctor in modo loquendi, locum istum revocasse, in I part. Summae quaest. 41, art. 2" (*ibid.*, cap. vi, p. 589).

[29]*Ibid.*, cap. iii, p. 584.

[30]*Ibid.*, cap. xviii, pp. 614-16.

[31]In the following passage from Bellarmine's *De Membris Ecclesiae,* Lib. II, cap. xxix (*Opera,* II, 575), there is an indication of what is meant by "coercion": "Respondeo, triplicem esse libertatem, ac triplicem item necessitatem . . . Tertiam ex parte coactionis, sive ea sit absoluta coactio, ut cum quis trahitur vi, quo ire non vult, sive sit moralis quaedam, et quasi conditionata coactio, ut cum quis nolet aliquid facere, et non libenter facit, facit tamen coactus timore aliquo humano, aut servili."

[32]Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. iv (*Opera,* V, 584).

[33]*Ibid.*, cap. v, p. 586.

this conclusion are wholly theological,[20] the simple statement of Bellarmine's opinion on this question will suffice.

Having expounded his definition of *liberum arbitrium,* Bellarmine proceeds to defend his contention that freedom is the specific difference. Following Aristotle, he makes a twofold distinction concerning natural liberty. There is a freedom which is simply the absence of coercion, and there is that freedom to which not only coercion but also necessity of nature is repugnant.[21] As an example of the first we may consider man's natural desire for happiness, which is such that he cannot desire to be unhappy. Nevertheless, his desire for happiness is not coerced—that is, imposed from without—but is voluntary, spontaneous, and free. That one be free also from any necessity of nature it is required that one be able to will or not will, just as he chooses, so that when a man walks or speaks he has it within his power also to sit down or to remain silent. That is, his nature does not require that he walk or speak when he does.[22]

It is on this particular point that Bellarmine takes issue with his contemporary opponents. Luther, Calvin, and Bucer are willing to grant that the will is free, provided only that freedom from coercion is meant and not freedom from any natural necessity. In the opposite camp with Bellarmine are the Roman pontiffs, Origen, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Damascene, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and other doctors and fathers of the Church. Claimed by both camps are Peter Lombard and Alphonse de Castro.[23]

To clarify Bellarmine's own position, it may be well to consider the corrections which he makes in Calvin's interpretation of the *Sentences.* Because Calvin, *pro suo more non solum perperam exponit Lombardi sententiam . . . sed etiam secum ipse pugnat,* Bellarmine takes up an analysis of the text of the *Sentences* and formulates the conclusion found there: The potency which is *liberum arbitrium* is free with respect to either of two alternatives; that is, it can be moved to one or to the other. *Liberum arbitrium* cannot be of the past or of the present, for both are already determined, but only of the future, which is not yet determined to either of the two alternatives. Though it is impossible that God perform an evil act, yet He does not act necessarily, for He can choose to act or not act. Consequently, the *ratio* of *liberum*

arbitrium is the power to choose or elect, without coercion or necessity, whatever the intellect judges to be desirable.[34]

Alphonse de Castro is drawn into the Bellarmine camp on the plea that, while in his manner of speaking De Castro seems to require only freedom from coercion, his true opinion is that freedom from necessity may not be lacking either. Thus, when Castro says that the freedom which is opposed to necessity is more truly called freedom from coercion, he makes it clear that he considers coercion to be any determination whatsoever to one thing rather than another; that is, one who is free from coercion can act or not act, will or not will.[35]

In treating the objection brought against his own opinion by those who cite St. Augustine as teaching that the will need not be free from necessity of nature, Bellarmine distinguishes between freedom of specification and freedom of exercise. The fact that man cannot will to be unhappy seems, at first sight, a denial of specificative freedom; still, not only is man free in this life with the freedom of exercise, so that he can freely desire happiness or cease desiring it, but he is also free with regard to specification when there is question of means not necessarily connected with the end. Accordingly, with respect to exercise, man's freedom from necessity of nature consists in his being able to will or not will; with respect to specification it consists in indetermination where nonnecessary means are concerned. Far from being a limitation of *liberum arbitrium,* what specificative necessity there is in man is the *virtus liberi arbitrii;* and to be able to choose evil, even under the aspect of good, is a defect of the will. Consequently, if this defect should be removed, the will, rather than being vitiated, would be made that much more free and strong.[36]

There is, besides the necessity of specification, another necessity attached to the will; namely, the necessity that the will act freely. That is, the will is free to choose this or that, or to choose or not to choose; but the nature of the will requires that its exercise be free in all cases and that the specification be free whenever there is question of a nonnecessary means to happiness.[37]

[34]Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiarum,* Lib. II, d. 25, cols. 706-10. Also Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. xiii, entitled *Liberum Arbitrium Esse tum Praesentium, tum Futurorum* (*Opera,* V, 604-6).

[35]Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. v (*Opera,* V, 586).

[36]*Ibid.,* cap. vi, pp. 587-88. Cf. also *De Membris Ecclesiae,* Lib. III, cap. x (*Opera,* III, 17).

[37]*De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. vi (*Opera,* V, 589).

The *ratio,* therefore, which distinguishes *liberum arbitrium* from any other potency is, for Bellarmine, an indetermination which is left untouched, not only by external forces (freedom from coercion) but also by any necessity arising from the nature of the will itself, except insofar as man necessarily desires happiness and the will necessarily acts freely.

A part of the definition of *liberum arbitrium* still to be defended against its opponents is the generic character of *potentia.* There are those who hold that *liberum arbitrium* is properly an *act* and not a power or habit. Their reasoning, according to Bellarmine, follows these lines: *Liberum arbitrium* is that by which man has it in his power to perform some act or its contrary, or to perform some act or not to perform it. The first act which is in the power of man to perform is to deliberate or to conclude a deliberation, for there can be no freedom before deliberation. But the will to deliberate necessarily precedes this deliberation, and some thought necessarily precedes the will to deliberate. Therefore, through the acts which precede any deliberation man has it in his power to deliberate, and it is in these acts that *liberum arbitrium* consists.

A second opinion is that *liberum arbitrium* is a *habit* arising somewhat naturally from the conjunction of reason and will: a certain facility of operation. Just as the complete ability to care for a family does not reside in the father or mother alone but in the two together, so freedom does not reside in the intellect or will alone, but in the habit or facility of operation resulting from a certain natural conjunction of reason and will.[28]

A third error is that of Durandus, who holds the opinion that *liberum arbitrium* is power of both reason and will but especially power of reason. Though reason cannot judge concerning necessary things in any way other than as those things really are, yet in probable or doubtful cases—and deliberation is always concerned with such cases—the reason is not bound to judge one way or the other. Further, if the reason were not free with regard to the last practical judgment, then the will would not be free either, for the will must elect what the reason determines ought to be elected. Moreover, the root of freedom lies in the knowledge of contingent means to an end, and

this knowledge is in the reason, which, therefore, is not only free itself, but is also the *ratio* of the will's freedom.[39]

Finally, there is the error of Scotus, who teaches that the will alone is free and neither depends upon nor is determined by any practical judgment of the reason. The practical judgment—and reason itself—is only a condition required that the will be able to act; for the will can, with all the necessary conditions being present, still choose not to act.[40]

In refutation of these errors, Bellarmine answers that *liberum arbitrium* cannot consist in the will to deliberate or in any thoughts which necessarily precede the will to deliberate; that is, it does not consist in any act which precedes the last practical judgment. Such thoughts or will acts are not continuously produced by man but are intermittent instead; therefore, were *liberum arbitrium* to consist in them, man would sometimes have the power and sometimes not have it. This, however, is impossible if the power of *liberum arbitrium* is, as all admit, something with which man is *naturally* endowed. Moreover, neither an indeliberate will to deliberate nor any thought preceding such a will act could be free, for freedom is rooted in reason—or deliberation—and it is formally in the will alone. Finally, acts of this kind, since they would determine one to think or will some particular thing, could not even be a cause of freedom.

Liberum arbitrium cannot reside formally in both intellect and will, as Durandus holds, for reason cannot be free, as is the will, either from coercion or from necessity of specification or exercise. Just as the will is inclined to good and cannot be coerced into any inclination to evil as such, so the intellect is inclined to the truth and cannot be coerced into any inclination to error as such. The will, moreover, as an inclination of the whole supposit, cannot be forced to desire anything other than what the whole supposit desires. The intellect,

[38]*Ibid.*, cap. vii, p. 590. Bellarmine says that St. Bonaventure's opinion stems from St. Bernard's definition of *liberum arbitrium* as a *habitus animi* and from Peter Lombard's calling it a *facultas rationis et voluntatis*. "Facultas enim, et facilitatem et habitum magis, quam potentiam sonat."

[39]*Ibid.*

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 591. Cf. Scotus, *Commentaria Oxoniensia* (Claras Aquas, 1914), *In II Sent.*, d. 25; II, 697. For Scotus the intellect is a *causa sine qua non* of volition; that is, the intellect does not act upon the will efficiently, but the apprehended object must be presented to the will. The will is the cause of its own action. Scotus gives an example: Wood has within itself, naturally, the power to burn, but it proceeds to act only when fire, the *causa sine qua non*, is present.

[41]Bellarmine, *De Gratia*, Lib. III, cap. viii, (*Opera*, V, 593).

on the other hand, is not an inclination of the whole person; accordingly, it can be compelled to incline toward that which is contrary to the inclination of the supposit. For example, one who is very ill may be compelled by the evidence to judge that his death is imminent, though his will—and, therefore, the whole supposit—is inclined to a belief that he will recover. It is evident, then, that neither intellect nor will can be coerced into an inclination contrary to that which is natural to it; but the intellect can be forced to accept what the supposit would reject, while the will cannot be forced to desire anything but what the supposit desires: the inclination of the supposit and the inclination of the will are one and the same.[41]

That the intellect is not free from specificative necessity is evident. If the intellect is presented with a necessary argument, it assents necessarily; if presented with a probable argument, it forms an opinion; if a contrary probable argument is presented, the intellect necessarily doubts. All this takes place without any deliberation about whether one should assent to a known truth. It is impossible also that the intellect should be free with regard to exercise. Every act proceeds from some appetite for good. But the appetite for good in a soul endowed with reason is nothing else than the will. It is this will, then, which moves the intellect to an act of understanding. If the intellect is also called an appetite, the term is used in the sense of that which inclines to a perpetual act, not that which inclines to the exercise here and now of the power of understanding or the cessation here and now from the exercise of that power. The appetite which moves to an act here and now is the inclination of the whole supposit: the will.

Therefore, Durandus and all those who would place the freedom of *liberum arbitrium* formally in any combination of will and intellect—whether in any habit arising from their conjunction or in the two powers themselves—are in error. On the other hand, Scotus and his followers, who make the will independent of the last practical judgment, except insofar as it is a necessary condition of any will act, are equally in error, for election depends necessarily upon the last judgment of the practical reason.

It is impossible that the will should act without a preceding judgment of reason. If the judgment is undetermined, the will must be

also. The last practical judgment (*hoc nunc . . . est faciendum*) is completely determined, and the will necessarily elects that which this judgment has determined is to be elected. Because the will is a *rational* appetite, the impossibility of its acting without a preceding judgment necessarily follows; and this specification of the appetite as rational is due to the will's object: *bonum apprehensum et judicatum conveniens.* Even one who acts "just because he wants to" does not exclude judgment from election, for he has judged that it is good for him to act for no other reason than his own will.[42]

If, when the judgment is definitely determined to one thing, the will were free to elect something else, there would be an election without a judgment and an object lacking for the action, both of which consequences would be contrary to the very meaning of *liberum arbitrium.* Therefore, Scotus's opinion that the will is completely independent of the judgment is certainly untenable.

In opposition to these errors which he has undertaken to refute, Bellarmine reiterates the doctrine upheld by St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan, Conrad, and others who follow St. Thomas. That is, *liberum arbitrium* is a particular potency, that of the will; but the root of freedom is in the reason, so that the will depends upon and is determined by the last judgment of the practical reason.

In order to maintain his position against those already cited as holding opposing views, Bellarmine finds it necessary to discuss the question of how the *will* can be truly free if it is determined by the last practical judgment; and it is in the discussion of this question that Bellarmine makes most clear what he himself holds regarding the nature of *liberum arbitrium.* The determination lent by the practical reason is to some particular good; but, before this determination, the will is itself determined to good in general. (It is this inclination to an *indeterminate* good which demonstrates that the will is a potency rather than a habit.) The question, then, is how the will can be determined to a particular good by reason and yet maintain its freedom.

[42]"Ille etiam qui dixit, sit pro ratione voluntas, non exclusit judicium ab electione, sed judicavit, bonum sibi esse contra rationem agere" (*ibid.*, p. 594).

[43]"Respondeo, judicium ultimum non pati secum aliud judicium simile, quia essent contradicentia et repugnantia judicia. Itaque ultimum judicium non negat, quin alia sint media utilia ad eumdem finem, sed dicit, omnibus consideratis hic et nunc, hoc unum esse accipiendum tamquam utilissimum, ac per hoc absolute et simpliciter melius caeteris . . . Non enim nunc habet nisi unum ultimum judicium . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 594).

Although only the will is formally free, the root of freedom is in the reason; the will is free *because* it is a *rational* appetite. It cannot incline toward anything unless the cognitive power presents that thing as something good and suitable. Nevertheless, the reason, with respect to means which have no necessary connection with the end, is not determined; it can present to the will various objects, each of which is in some respect good and in some respect evil. The will, then, is free because it follows reason, which presents to it various and contingent means to an end. The intellect is not free, because it depends upon its object; the will, on the contrary, receives nothing from its object and is not acted upon by its object. Nor is there any reason why the intellect *should* be free, for truths do not oppose one another, as do the contingent goods presented to the will, but all truth may be apprehended and assented to at one and the same time.

It appears, consequently, that the will is free because there are various nonnecessary means to the end, and the intellect is not naturally determined to present to the will any particular one of these contingent means. However, the intellect *is* determined by the last practical judgment so that it presents to the will only one contingent good at any one time.

> The last judgment does not allow of there being any other judgment simultaneous with itself, for there would be, then, contradictory and repugnant judgments. The last judgment does not negate the possibility that there should be any other means useful for attaining the same end, but simply says that, everything being taken into consideration here and now, this one thing is to be taken as the most useful and therefore absolutely and simply better than the others. Accordingly, if the will were then to choose something else it would indeed have a reason for choosing such a means—that it is useful—but the will would not have any reason for omitting that other thing which here and now is judged to be better simply. There is, then, only one last judgment, nor can there be more; for they would be contradictories; namely, taking everything into consideration, this is better, and, taking everything into consideration, this is not better.[48]

Therefore, that on which the will depends for its own determination is itself determined; and this determination of the last practical judgment stands as a barrier between the will and the prior indetermination of the intellect upon which the will's freedom is supposed to depend. Were this the sum and substance of Bellarmine's position, he too might have entitled his work, *De Servo Arbitrio*, as Luther did. However, there is still one important point to consider. The will is free, not because it is not determined by the last practical judgment—for it is so determined—but because this very judgment lies within the power of the will.[44]

When the intellect proposes various means and adverts to what is good and what is evil in each one, the will already is inclined—*not however, with the fullness of an election*—to one means one moment and to another the next moment. And it is within the power of the will, by a kind of *negative determination*, to permit itself to be moved or not permit itself to be moved. The fact that the will permits itself to be moved by one means and does not permit itself to be moved by any of the other means that are presented brings it about that the reason leaves off its deliberation and arrives at a particular judgment, upon which the will's election necessarily follows.[45]

Election, it must be added, does not mean precisely that act of the

[44]". . . sed quoniam istud ipsum judicium ultimum et practicum in potestate voluntatis est" (*ibid.*, cap. ix, p. 596).

[45]"Sciendum est enim, post cognitionem boni in universum mox existere in voluntate inclinationem aliquam in illud, non tamen plenam electionem: deinde cum proponuntur a ratione varia media, et ostenditur quid boni et quid mali sit in unoquoque, voluntatem inclinari modo in unam partem, modo in aliam; et in ejus potestate esse, ut sinat se moveri, vel resistat, non quidem actu positivo, sed negativo, non sinendo videlicet se moveri. Per hoc enim quod voluntas sinit se moveri ab una ratione proposita, fit ut mens omissa alia inquisitione pergat et concludat judicium particulare, ad quod continuo sequitur electio. Itaque libertas voluntatis in eo proprie sita esse videtur, quod propositis variis rationibus non necessariis, sinat se moveri ab una, et non ab alia" (*ibid.*).

[46]*Ibid.*, p. 598. Bellarmine refers here to St. Thomas, *ST*, I-II, q. 13, a. 1 (ed. Leonine, VI, 98) where it is said most clearly that election is one composite act of which appetite is as the material principle and judgment the formal principle: "Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidam est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationalis." For Bellarmine, despite his reference to this passage, election is not a single composite act of the matter-form variety, but a conjunction of two acts.

[47]"Non igitur ratio concurrit solum ut conditio applicans objectum, sed ut causa faciens objectum, dum rei bonae tribuit vim quamdam motivam, et facit ut ea res sit actu expetibilis, quae solum antea erat expetibilis in potentia" (Bellarmine, *De Gratia*, Lib. III, cap. ix [*Opera*, V, 598]). This *vis motiva*, of course, is in the order of final, not efficient, causality.

will which follows the last judgment, but it means that act together with the very conclusion of the practical reason. As St. Thomas says, election is an act elicited by the *will* but *bearing with it* an act of the *reason* also.[46] Therefore, since it includes both acts—namely, the last judgment of reason and the assent of the will—election is truly concerned with more than one possibility. Its determination is within man's power; it is absolutely and properly free.

If the election is free, then, because the last judgment of the practical reason is under the control of the *will,* there is question of how reason can be the root and cause of freedom rather than a mere condition. First of all, reason does not merely represent the objects of choice; it *makes* them. No matter how good a thing may be in itself, it cannot be an object of the will unless the intellect judges it to be good, suitable, and desirable. Before this judgment, a good is merely potentially an object of the will; after the judgment, the good is endowed with a kind of power which enables it to move the will.[47] As the powers take their essence and species from their object, so the will takes its essence and species from the good which the reason presents; and in the fact that the intellect can propose various goods and deliberate about them lies the *ratio* of the will's freedom.

Causal Relationship between Intellect and Will

In Bellarmine's view, does man through his will move his intellect to make some particular last practical judgment, or does the intellect move the will so that man inclines to what the judgment presents as desirable? In explaining how the will is free though determined by the last practical judgment, Bellarmine states that the will permits itself to be *moved* by one of the means which the intellect presents as desirable. However, this movement cannot possibly be in the order of efficient causality. If the intellect were to *effect* a movement of the will, the act of willing—and any movement of the will is an act of willing—would proceed from the intellect; but, since willing is an immanent action, patient and agent must be the same. Therefore, the will alone must be the efficient cause of its own will acts.

Since the acts of the intellect, too, are immanent acts, it would seem

that the will could not possibly exercise any efficient causality with regard to the intellect. However, there are two distinctions to be made. First of all, the will is by its nature an inclination and impulse of the *total* supposit, while the intellect is not an inclination or impulse at all, but rather something which receives or apprehends. Secondly, there are two ways in which powers move: by having their proper objects impressed upon them and by effecting the exercise of their proper functions. As a result of the first distinction, though will acts are immanent, their effects need not be confined to the power itself or to a *part* of the supposit; they may extend to the entire supposit, including the intellect. With regard to the second distinction, while the effect which the will has on the intellect cannot be one of specification—impressing its proper object upon it—the will can move the intellect efficiently by inclining it to the exercise of its own acts.

The causal relationship is this: In the act of election, the will itself is the material and also the efficient cause. The *intrinsic* formal cause, by which the will acts, is its own natural inclination to the good, in which are included virtually all particular inclinations. However, this inclination is indifferent to many things and requires an *extrinsic* formal cause to specify it. This extrinsic formal cause is the object conceived by the mind and judged to be desirable. Not only is this object a *formal* cause, but it is also the *final* cause of the will's act, so that it specifies, not actively or efficiently, but as end. If the object were to *produce* the act of willing as species, it would also have to produce it as genus (undetermined inclination), for nothing can concur actively in the production of the thing as it is specifically unless it concur actively in the production of the thing as it is generically. Nor is this manner of extrinsic specification peculiar to the will. It is true also of the intellect and the senses, for they are not specified by any intrinsic form of the potencies themselves but are indifferent to many forms. Therefore, that which specifies an act of intellect or sense is an *extrinsic* formal cause.

There is this difference, however, that the nonappetitive powers do

[48] *Ibid.*, cap. xi, p. 603: "Nam potentiae apprehensivae non sunt in actu primo, nisi recipiant similitudinem objecti, et ideo sunt ex natura sua potentiae partim passivae, partim activae: appetitivae autem potentiae sunt in actu primo per inclinationem generalem ad bonum. Et ideo simpliciter sunt activae, et se ipse [sic] movent ad praesentiam objecti, quamvis *ab eo nihil recipiant*" (*ibid.*, cap. xi, p. 603; italics mine).

not act merely at the presence of their objects but only when the object has been received into them. This is due to the fact that the apprehensive powers are not *naturally* in first act (*in actu primo*) but only after they have received the likeness of their object. The appetitive powers, on the contrary, are by their very nature *in actu primo* or at least capable of producing a first act. They are, therefore, wholly active potencies and do not need to receive their objects into themselves before acting. Upon the mere presentation of the object they move themselves.[48] This means that the will's act is not actively produced by a phantasm or by a known object or by the mind itself, as would be the case if the will were a wholly passive potency. Nor, as would be the case if the will were partly active and partly passive, is the will's act produced by concurring partial causes; that is, by the will *plus* the known object or the practical reason itself. Rather, the will *alone* is the cause of its own acts, and it need not be put in act by anything other than itself.

If *liberum arbitrium* were a passive potency, it could not be said to be free, for it is not in the power of a patient to determine what shall be done to it, just as it is not in the power of prime matter to determine what form it shall receive. The will, moreover, could not determine itself if it were passive, even by resisting, for resisting depends upon a contrary quality, and the will is indifferent by nature to contraries.

Those things which some thinkers have posited as effecting the will's act—phantasms, the object presented by the intellect, the intellect itself—are such that they are not even *able* to act efficiently on the will. If the phantasm were the efficient cause, then the soul separated from the body would be incapable of willing. Moreover, because the phantasm is something *corporeal*, it cannot have any power over the *spiritual* will. The objects presented by the intellect are excluded from any efficient causality with regard to the will, for such objects are often things which have their existence only *in cogitatione* and not *in re*. And how can something which does not really exist have any effect on the will? Moreover, objects which are privative are sometimes presented by the intellect, and a *positive* act of the will can scarcely be effected by something which is a mere nega-

tion. Therefore, the will must be a wholly active potency; that is, it must move itself.

If it is possible for the will truly to move itself, what happens to the principle "Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur"? Just as a living being can move itself because it is in act in one respect and in potency in another, so the will can move itself because it is in act with respect to the end and in potency with respect to the means. That is, the will naturally desires the end; and, being *in actu primo* in this respect, it can move itself actually to desire the means by which the end can be attained.[49] The will does not determine itself by reason of its indetermination, but by reason of its being in act and free, or not determinable by another.

The will does not, however, move itself to its first act, or *prima appetitio finis.* Such self-movement would proceed to infinity; for, since an agent acts only from a desire for an end, the will would have to desire before it could desire.[50] Rather, God, as efficient cause of the will, has impressed upon it its natural inclination, from which the first act, or *prima appetitio finis,* naturally follows. Nevertheless, this first act does proceed efficiently from the will, not as cause of its own nature but as a caused, wholly active potency whose proper acts are immanent.[51] The will is, then, by its very nature, capable of a first act

[49]"Sic igitur voluntas ex amore finis, quem habet actu, movet se ad amorem mediorum, quem habet in potentia; et circa ipsum finem est in actu, ratione inclinationis cujusdam generalis ad bonum, per quam movetur ad particularem inclinationem ad hoc aut illud bonum; et est in potentia ratione hujus particularis inclinationis, quam non semper habet" (*ibid.*, p. 601).

[50]"Jam vero primam appetitionem finis esse naturalem, et Deo auctori tribuendam, hac ratione probat egregie S. Thomas: Omne quod agit, agit propter finem, sive ex appetitione finis: ergo quando voluntas movet se et agit, ex appetitione finis se movet et agit: ergo antequam se moveat et agat, debet habere appetitionem finis: ergo ad primam finis appetitionem non se ipsa movet, neque proprie agit, sed movetur et agitur ab auctore naturae, *per naturalem inclinationem voluntati impressam*" (*ibid.*, cap. x, p. 599; italics mine).

[51]"Tertia sententia plane media, et meo judicio verior est Cajetani . . . Et Ferrariensis . . . qui docent, primum actum voluntatis fieri efficienter ab ipsa voluntate, sed tribui Deo auctori, quoniam sit naturalis, et sequatur ex inclinatione illa naturali, quam Deus in voluntate impressit: et eum fere modum quo gravia et levia dicuntur moveri a generante. Et haec sententia videtur esse vere S. Thomae in 1.2., quaest. 6, art. 4. et 6" (*ibid.*).

[52]An interesting discussion of the nature of the will's first act, as viewed by several commentators of St. Thomas, can be found in an article by Robert P. Sullivan, O.P., "Natural Necessitation of the Human Will (Conclusion)," *Thomist,* XIV (October, 1951), 490-528. This article, however, suffers from the author's vitriolic attack on an opponent, an attack which goes so far as to insinuate that the opponent deliberately attempted to deceive his readers by wilfully misinterpreting St. Thomas.

and in potency only with respect to the determination of this act.

While the natural inclination to good in general which God impresses upon the will seems to be given to it in such a way that the will is passive, the *actus primus* is elicited by the will but also by God *through* the natural inclination. Because the first act is a *primus amor finis* there can be no *preceding* desire for an end because of which the will could act; therefore, God must, as author of the will's nature, move it to its first act; and yet this first act is immanent and, consequently, from the will also.[52]

Such are the outlines of Bellarmine's theory of *liberum arbitrium.* There are, however, two questions, quite peculiar to Bellarmine's explanation, which will be given special consideration in the following section.

Negative Determination and Extrinsic Formal Cause

The problems to be considered in this section have already been given cursory treatment; however, because of their important implications with respect to the intellectualist-voluntarist question and because they are as the specific difference distinguishing Bellarmine's theory of *liberum arbitrium* from that of others, they merit a more detailed investigation. The problems might be formulated in two questions: What is negative determination? What is an extrinsic formal cause? The intellectualist-voluntarist question will be treated concomitantly.

There are, according to St. Robert, two extreme opinions on the question of whether the will is the cause of its own acts. There are those, such as Origen, Pelagius, and Durandus, who teach that God is the cause of all man does only inasmuch as God has given and conserves man's operative powers. At the other extreme are those who teach that God is the immediate and proper cause of everything in such a manner that secondary causes really effect nothing. It is simply at their presence that God alone does all. Between these rightly rejected extremes is the opinion of St. Thomas and other Scholastics. According to this Thomistic *via media,* whatever is, is from God. Therefore, if there is any movement of the will, that movement is from

God. However, the divine motion is received in secondary causes, not uniformly, but according to their disposition. Now, if the disposition of the will according to which the divine motion is received were also from God, there could be no such thing as freedom in the human will, but every human act would be completely caused by God, not only with respect to its *esse* but also with respect to its determination.[53]

Put into syllogistic form, St. Robert's premises demand some such solution as "negative determination": Whatever has being is from God. But that which determines the disposition of the human will according to which the divine motion is received is not from God. Therefore, that which determines the disposition of the human will according to which the divine motion is received is not anything that has being. It is, then, a nonentity, a negative determination.

The universal cause of any human will act is God, but the particular cause is the person who wills. The universal cause is itself indifferent to this or that *particular* will act; the specification is from the secondary cause. Still, Bellarmine insists, the human act is totally from God in

[53]Bellarmine, *De Amissione Gratiae*, Lib. II, cap. xviii (*Opera*, V, 299-300).

[54]"Respondeo, actionem humanam plane totam esse a Deo, et ab ipso habere, non solum esse genericum, sed etiam specificum, et singulare: caeterum id habere per concursum Dei determinatum ad actionem talem a voluntate humana. Proinde non habere esse specificum ex modo agendi Dei, sed ex modo agendi voluntatis humanae" (*ibid.*, p. 300). That is, every act of willing has its existence from God, not only inasmuch as it is an effect of the general inclination toward good which God has impressed upon the soul—act of willing considered as generic—but also its existence inasmuch as it is an act of willing this or that particular thing—act of willing considered as specified. Nevertheless, since the *esse* of the act arises from God's general *concursus determined* by the human will to this or that particular act, the *esse specificum* cannot be said to be an effect of the *mode* of divine action, but only of the human will's mode of acting. Because the human will's *determination* is a *non ens*, it cannot itself effect any act of existing but only concur with the divine action by giving to it the negative determination which makes an *esse genericum* an *esse specificum*.

[55]". . . deinde cum proponuntur a ratione varia media, et ostenditur quid boni et quid mali sit in unoquoque, voluntatem inclinari modo in unam partem, modo in aliam; et in ejus potestate esse, ut sinat se moveri, vel resistat, *non quidem actu positivo, sed negativo, non sinendo videlicet se moveri*. Per hoc quod voluntas sinit se moveri ab una ratione proposita, fit ut mens omissa alia inquisitione pergat et concludat judicium particulare, ad quod continuo sequitur electio" (Bellarmine, *De Gratia*, Lib. III, cap. ix [*Opera*, V, 596]; italics mine).

[56]". . . sanctus Thomas in eo ponit libertatem et causam peccati, quod voluntas cum ab una parte trahitur ad peccandum a voluptate per sensum et rationem apprehensa et proposita ut bona, ab altera revocatur a peccato per rationem proponentem legem Dei, et repraesentantem voluptatem illam ut noxiam, *ipsa sinit se moveri a sensu*, et attendit ad bonum propositum in voluptate, *et non sinit se moveri a ratione proponente legem Dei*, et sic non attendit ad veram regulam bonae actionis" (*ibid.*, p. 597; italics mine).

that it has its "specific *esse*" as well as its "generic *esse*" from Him. Nevertheless, it is specifically *what* it is, not by reason of the divine mode of acting, but because of the human will's own mode of acting. And this mode of acting is the effect of the will's negative determination.[54]

As has been seen above, when the intellect presents the will with various contingent goods, the will is inclined to some extent—not with the fullness of an election, however—to all the various goods proposed. This is the result of the will's natural inclination to the good in general. Then, not by any positive act—that is, not by anything which has being—the will *fails* to permit itself to be moved by all except one of the goods proposed. The intellect then terminates its deliberation by judging that here and now the one good by which the will has not failed to permit itself to be moved should be elected.[55] Because the "act" which the will elicits in this negative determination does not have *esse*, it need not—in fact, it cannot—come from God. To effect something which has no *esse* is not really to do anything at all, but rather to fail to do something. For example, if two men are presented with a beautiful but illicit object, one may fail to permit himself to be moved (in the order of final causality) by the beauty of the object; the other may fail to permit himself to be moved by the law of God which makes the object illicit. Because the failing is a *non ens*, the men alone are responsible for the effect, which is negative determination.[56]

This, then, is Bellarmine's explanation of freedom of election. Freedom of exercise is also dependent upon a negative determination. If God moves the will, the will cannot fail to act, and yet its exercise is free; for God does not move the will unless the will has previously disposed itself, by a negative determination, to receive the divine influx according to a certain mode. Therefore, when there is question of *unum et idem acceptandi, vel pro arbitrio respuendi (libertas contradictionis)*, the will can fail to permit itself to be moved by the good involved in *accepting* the proposed object, or it can fail to permit itself to be moved by the good involved in *rejecting* the proposed object. And election, then, will follow according to the manner in

which the will has disposed itself; and until there has been such a disposition, there can be no election.

Therefore, Bellarmine concludes, the freedom of the will must properly be posited in the fact that, various nonnecessary goods being proposed, the will can permit itself to be moved by one and not by any of the others. This explanation of the will's freedom, however, raises a question. In view of the fact that negative determination precedes any practical judgment and the subsequent election is determined by this negative determination, does not Bellarmine's position ultimately resolve itself into one of voluntarism? It is difficult to see how such a conclusion can be avoided, even though it is quite obvious that St. Robert, if he is a voluntarist, is a wholly involuntary one. That is, he would like not to be a voluntarist, and yet the only reason he can give for the will's negative determination is the will itself. The intellect, of course, must present some possible object; but the two powers are so separated that the will's self-determination is, at best, only *extrinsically* rational. *Preceding* the negative determination there is an act of the intellect (not a *judgment* on which the determination is based) followed by a failure on the part of the will to permit itself to be moved. It is not clear that Bellarmine has explained the freedom of the will without sacrificing its nature as *rational* appetite. His teaching on the question of *extrinsic formal cause,* moreover, seems to be a further step in the direction of voluntarism.

The act of election includes, not only the act of the will, but also an intellectual act. However, the good proposed by the last judgment of the practical intellect is to the will's act only an *extrinsic* formal cause. That the proposed good cannot be an *intrinsic* formal cause of the will's act is evident from the fact that an intrinsic formal cause must be an effect of whatever is the efficient cause of the will's act.[57] And, since the will's acts are necessarily immanent, they can have as true efficient cause only the will itself. The intrinsic formal cause is, then, the will's natural inclination which includes virtually all the

[57]"Causa enim formalis, effectus est causae efficientis" (Bellarmine, *De Reparatione Gratiae,* Lib. II, cap. xii [*Opera,* VI, 237-38]).

[58]"Sed quoniam ista inclinatio generalis ex se indifferens est ad multa, propterea requiritur alia forma extrinseca, quae determinet priorem quoad specificationem, et haec est objectum ipsum mente conceptum et judicatum ut conveniens, quod etiam finis est actionis" (Bellarmine, *De Gratia,* Lib. III, cap. xi, p. 602).

[59]*Ibid.*

particular inclinations of volition. This general inclination, however, needs an extrinsic formal cause by which it may be determined specifically. This extrinsic formal cause is the object judged by the intellect to be desirable here and now.[58]

An analogous causality may be observed with regard to locomotion in animals. In such locomotion, the efficient cause and the subject are the same; the intrinsic formal cause is the power of locomotion; the *final* cause *by which the motion is specified*—and, therefore, a formal cause—is the extrinsic *ubi*. Similarly in election, the efficient cause of volition is identical with the subject, the will itself; the intrinsic formal cause is the will's general inclination, which is as a *virtus;* and the extrinsic formal cause, which specifies the volition, is the good proposed by the intellect as an end. Accordingly, if the extrinsic formal cause of a volitional act is no more a part of the act than the extrinsic *ubi* of locomotion is a part of the act of moving, there can scarcely be said to be any intellectual-appetitive composite act. Though, for Bellarmine, the object known intellectually specifies the volitional act, it does not at all enter into any real composition with that act in the manner in which matter and form are parts of one composite being. The intellectual and volitional acts remain separate entities; there is no single intellectual-appetitive act.

Acts of understanding and sensing, too, are specified by an extrinsic formal cause. While the powers themselves have an intrinsic form which makes them be what they are, their acts must be specified from without by their objects, which are both extrinsic formal and final causes.[59] Intellect and the senses receive within themselves a similitude of these objects and then the powers themselves effect acts which are *specified* by the objects but apparently not at all *effected* by them. Again, there is no single composite act in which the powers concur with their extrinsic formal causes.

Bellarmine's teaching on the subject of extrinsic formal cause seems to lead, then, as does his theory of negative determination, to an act of willing which is not essentially rational. In the act of election, intellect and will are as if in two wholly separate compartments; their acts are contiguous but never really united. Again, it must be stated that Bellarmine obviously would not countenance a voluntaristic view-

point, and yet his teaching does seem to lead in that direction. This may, however, be one of the defects which seem to follow necessarily from a detailed analysis of man's powers, for intense concern with detail has as an unavoidable consequence some obscuring of the all-important fact that it is the *man* who judges and wills, while his powers are only the instruments he uses.

Summary

Bellarmine's position on *liberum arbitrium* may be summarized as follows.

Materially, *liberum arbitrium* refers solely to the will, for only the will is truly and properly free. Formally, *liberum arbitrium* is that free potency with which intelligent or rational natures are endowed by which they can choose among contingent means suitable to the attainment of an end or freely accept or reject a means when no alternative to that means is offered.

The freedom involved is not only freedom from coercion but also the absence of any natural necessity. The will, as *voluntas*, is naturally necessitated to desire good in general; but as *liberum arbitrium* the will is naturally free to choose among particular goods, to accept or reject any one of them. The *ratio* which distinguishes *liberum arbitrium* from any other power is its freedom, its natural indetermination, and its ability to determine itself.

The will exercises its freedom in its proper act, *electio*, which includes not only the act of the will but also the last judgment of the practical reason. The freedom of election involves both specification and exercise, specification being the choice between alternatives, and exercise the voluntary acceptance or rejection of an object when no alternative is offered.

Freedom is formally in the will, but the reason, which effects the *judicium ultimum*, is the root and cause of that freedom. As the *ratio* of freedom, the intellect is able to present various contingent means to the will; as the cause of freedom, the intellect *makes* the object of the will, for only a *known* good can be such an object. The act of the will depends upon the last judgment of the practical reason in such a way that election necessarily follows that judgment. Nevertheless, the act of willing is free, for the will itself inclines the intellect, by

means of a negative determination, to conclude to a certain last judgment.

Because the will is an inclination of the whole supposit and the intellect is not, the will can effect the exercise of the intellect, but the intellect cannot effect the exercise of the will. Because the acts of intellect and will are immanent, neither intellect nor will can be efficient cause of the specification of the other. The intellect specifies the will only inasmuch as it presents to the will its object. The object is an extrinsic formal cause at whose *presence* the will cannot fail to effect its own act. The intrinsic formal cause of an election is the will's natural inclination to good in general.

The will, as a wholly active potency, is by its nature *in actu primo* with respect to *good in general.* By means of this first act the will moves itself from its natural potency with respect to *particular goods* to an act of election, the will's *second act.* The will's first act, *prima appetitio finis,* is impressed upon it by God, Who is the efficient cause of the will. Nevertheless, since this first act is immanent, the will itself is efficient cause in the order of secondary causality.

To what degree St. Robert Bellarmine was original in his thinking and to what degree he was influenced by his predecessors is a problem whose solution would involve more research and more extended treatment than is feasible in a paper of this type. Similarly, a thorough evaluation of the Bellarmine theory would involve unwarranted prolixity and be, moreover, impossible without some generally accepted criterion upon which to base such criticism. However, the simple exposition of Bellarmine's thought can be fruitful insofar as it does indicate certain problems which must be met and certain errors which must be avoided in any attempt to elaborate a wholly satisfactory explanation of *liberum arbitrium.*

Chronicle

The Fourth International Thomistic Congress was held in Rome, September 13 to 17, 1955, at the invitation of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Over three hundred persons were in attendance, mostly Europeans; fewer than ten were present from both Americas. The congress opened with an address by His Holiness, Pius XII, at his summer residence of Castel Gandolfo, where he received those attending the congress. In this address, His Holiness repeated themes he has often stressed in the past several years, that modern science has progressively come closer to philosophy, that philosophers ought to have a good knowledge of modern science, and that philosophy and science ought to help each other. As examples, His Holiness mentioned that, on the one hand, philosophy can offer science clearly established first principles and a soundly realistic epistemology, and, on the other, that modern physics has established the contingence of all material things.

The congress was organized around three themes: the doctrine of St. Thomas compared with modern science, with Hegelianism and Marxism, and with existentialism. Thomists the world over were invited to submit papers on one or more of these themes (rigid limits of length being imposed), and the papers were prepublished.[1] The mode of procedure was the following. The papers pertaining to each theme were divided into two groups, and a "summarizer" (*relator*) was appointed for each group. After each summary, those who wished to speak were given opportunity (determined by the amount of time available). This method, though it enabled a large number of persons to speak personally in the congress, was not calculated to bring about an intellectually satisfying discussion but rather to offer fragmentary, disunited views on the general topic. The summarizers were asked also to summarize the "discussions" (more accurately, little speeches), but most often there were no conclusions possible.

The summarizers for the three themes were the following: for the first theme, the Reverend Guérard des Lauriers, O.P. (Le Saulchoir) and the

(Continued on p. 110)

[1] *Sapientia Aquinatis. Communicationes IV Congressus Thomistici Internationalis.* (Bibliotheca Pontificiae Academiae Romanae, I). Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1955. Pp. 610. It is also planned to publish these papers in future issues of *Doctor Communis.*

Anthony A. Nemetz

LOGIC AND THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES IN ARISTOTLE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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This paper was read before the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, in May, 1954, in a shorter form under the title, "Is Aquinas an Aristotelian?"

To specify a philosophic relation between the works of two philosophers is always difficult. In the case of St. Thomas and Aristotle the difficulty is compounded by the fact that St. Thomas uses basic Aristotelian terms and distinctions. However, a change in subject-matter context and in purpose of inquiry causes shifts in the meaning of terms and also provides a new employment for familiar distinctions. Instances of such shifts can be found both in the identification and ordering of speculative principles as well as in the modes of formulating and solving practical problems.

The different treatments which Aristotle and St. Thomas give to such topics as the analysis of the ontological character of the good, beauty, and the existence and function of the ideas may serve to illustrate speculative differences.[1] And the difference in the schema of the moral virtues, both in terms of the principle of organization as well as in the identification of the architectonic moral virtue, illustrates a difference in the orientation of the practical science as treated by St. Thomas and Aristotle.[2]

It may be argued that the examples cited are only incidental differences in the sense of isolated doctrines but that if broader philosophic perspectives are employed the essential philosophic positions of both men are homogeneous or nearly so. The burden of this paper is to show at least one essential philosophic respect—that is, the organiza-

tion of the sciences—in which the philosophies of St. Thomas and Aristotle are not homogeneous.

To make a cogent argument in support of this position involves minimally the commitment that the metaphysical mark of the distinction among the parts of the Aristotelian corpus is the division of the sciences into speculative, practical, and productive.[3] Because this distinction is made in terms of final causality it would be redundant to note that it is a necessary distinction; and because it is a distinction concerning the kinds of science, it is a metaphysical or architectonic division.

It should be noted that in the *Topics*[4] Aristotle divides propositions and problems into ethical, natural, and logical. But that this distinction cannot be considered as equivalent to, or identical with, the distinction between speculative, practical, and productive can be seen from the double observation that what is being divided in both cases is not the same, nor is the purpose of the division identical in both instances. In the *Metaphysics*[5] Aristotle divides *dianoia* into speculative, practical, and productive; but in the *Topics*[6] it is *protasis* and

[1]The statements below exemplify the opposed treatments on these subjects:

a) St. Thomas on the good: "Every being is good" (*ST*, I, q. 5, a. 3).

Aristotle on the good: "But if the ideas are also ideas of substance, all animals and plants and all individuals that share in the ideas will be good; these absurdities follow . . ." (*Metaphysics* N. 4. 1091b29-30).

b) St. Thomas on ideas: "As ideas, according to Plato, were the principles of things and of their generation, an idea, as existing in the mind of God, has this twofold office" (*ST*, I, q. 15, a. 3).

Aristotle on ideas: "To say that the forms are patterns and that other things participate in them is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors" (*Metaphysics* M. 4. 1079b25-27).

c) St. Thomas on beauty: "Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally, for they are based on the same thing; namely, the form. And this is why goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ in reason" (*ST*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1).

Aristotle on beauty: "Since goodness and beauty are distinct (for it is always in actions that goodness is present, whereas beauty is also in immoveable things)" (*Metaphysics* M. 3. 1078a31-33).

[2]Moral correctness both for Aristotle and St. Thomas depends upon human inquiry. But such inquiry for St. Thomas is directed by divine command and its results checked by divine law. Consequently for St. Thomas both justice and religion are architectonic moral virtues which find their formal unification in charity. See *ST*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8; q. 58, a. 12; q. 31, a. 6.

[3]*Metaphysics* E. 1. 1025b25-26.

[4]i. 14. 105b19-31.

[5]E. 1. 1025b25.

[6]i. 14. 105b19-20.

[7]*Topics* i. 14. 105b30-31.

[8]*Republic* vii. 14-15. 533-35.

[9]*Prior Analytics* i. 1. 24a1-3.

[10]*Ibid.*, 2. 25a32-36. For a more detailed account of this point, see my paper in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1954, pp. 142-48.

problema which are divided into physical, ethical, and logical. Furthermore, Aristotle observes that the purpose of treating these things in dialectic is the concern for opinion, whereas in philosophy the concern of the treatment is truth.[7] This double distinction certainly suggests that the division in the *Topics* is due to the very nature of dialectic as opposed to the kind of distinction appropriate to science.

In opposition to this essential distinctiveness among the parts of knowledge lies the Platonic conviction of the organic interrelatedness of every aspect of reasoned and reasonable activity—a view which holds that dialectic is properly the only science and also the method of all the other forms of inquiry.[8]

The first and negative function of this paper is, thus, to contrast St. Thomas's notion of logic and the order of the sciences with that of Aristotle in order to decide whether on this point St. Thomas, despite the apparent similarity of language and distinction, proposes a schema which in intent is more Platonic than Aristotelian.

Aristotle formulates the conditions of science in the *Organon*. Broadly stated, the logic of Aristotle is an analysis of symbols rather than an analysis of either categories of things or the contents of mind in the sense of images or likenesses. The opening chapter of *On Interpretation* clearly states that the concern of this inquiry is with symbols rather than with the passions of the soul or with the things which have effected such passions. The same point can be made by briefly referring to the basic element of the syllogism for "its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out is demonstrative science."[9] The symbols with which syllogizing deals are the symbols of predication or terms, and it is the interrelation of the nature and position of terms which generates the syllogism.[10] To be sure, terms stand for concepts and things, but the specification of canons for the organization of demonstrative discourse depends essentially on those properties of terms which are neither conceptual nor ontological. For unless this were the case, the procedure in the *De Anima* and in *On Interpretation* would be the same which Aristotle vigorously denies saying:

> Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not

the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. *This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us.*[11]

A second observation will help to indicate the Aristotelian conception of the nature of logic and its place in philosophy. In the *Metaphysics* he notes that "there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance."[12] But if the concern of logic is not primarily with the ontological or conceptual references of terms but rather with those characteristics of language that in combination allow for the discovery, articulation, and testing of principles and attributes of primary and secondary substances, then it follows that logic itself is not primarily concerned with a kind of substance. Consequently, logic is not strictly spoken of as a part of philosophy but is an absolutely necessary propaedeutic to philosophizing.

To insist on logic as an analysis of symbols runs the risk of confusing logic with rhetoric and poetry. For if symbol means that which represents a passion of the soul, then even if logic is separated from the substantive disciplines, there still remain those inquiries which are not concerned with natural substances but which do treat of verbal symbols. And logic must also be differentiated from these. Aristotle is careful to distinguish these disciplines in terms of their final cause, which involves a difference in the kind of truth, the mode of apprehension, and the technique of exposition appropriate to each. For purposes here the question of the kinds of truth will suffice as typical of the complete differentiation. Logic deals with the truth of the necessary conditions of demonstrative science in three senses: (*a*) the

[11]*On Interpretation*, 1. 16a9-18 (italics mine).

[12]Γ. 2. 1004a3.

[13]*Rhetoric* i. 1. 1354a1.

[14]*Ibid.*, 2-3.

[15]*Ibid.*, 1355a4-5.

[16]*Ibid.*, 1355a35-36. On metaphysical ground this is why rhetoric is not properly a part of philosophy. Aristotle notes: "The more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be refashioning them and *shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning*" (*ibid.*, 3. 1359a12-18 [italics mine]).

[17]*Ibid.*, 1. 1355a21.

[18]*Ibid.*, 2. 1056b28-29.

[19]*Ibid.*, 1058a36-37

analysis of basic truths within a science or with the discovery of the basic truths appropriate to a subject genus (*Posterior Analytics*); (*b*) the critical analysis of all principles irrespective both of their appropriateness to a subject genus and of the necessity of their truth—an analysis which is a propaedeutic to their formulation as necessary truths, but which is distinct from the analytic process (*Topics*); (c) the discrimination of the probable from the improbable or the discovery of these sources of error which falsify dialectical inquiry (*On Sophistical Refutations*).

The opening passage of the *Rhetoric* indicates that rhetoric is indeed to be distinguished from logic: "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic."[13] It is a counterpart inasmuch as the subject matter of both begins with what falls within "the general ken of all men and belongs to no definite science."[14] But rhetoric is distinct from dialectic in purpose. For rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us;[15] "and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects."[16] The sense of persuasion here is that argument which gives the ground or motive for deliberative action rather than that which provides a path to science as does dialectic. Although Aristotle does note that the truth has a natural tendency to prevail over the false,[17] this does not mean that rhetoric is concerned with distinguishing the true from the false. On the contrary, the task of rhetoric is to persuade, and any rhetorical argument is in the last analysis "persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades."[18] Persuasiveness, thus, is the truth of rhetoric. A sign of this commitment can be taken from the fact that the divisions of rhetoric are "determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches"[19]—a ground of division which is radically opposed to philosophic division.

Unlike rhetoric, poetry is not concerned with verbal symbols that have as their end action; rather, the end of poetry can be found in the nature of its genetic principle, imitation. And instruction and delight are the natural grounds for imitation. The actions of men or demigods, either good or bad, are the subjects of imitation; and the means of imitation are verbal symbols. What is important here is to note that the method of both constructing and analyzing poetry does not involve

a concern for what did or what morally ought to happen, but with "what might happen."[20] Hence the kind of instruction which poetry can give is not that of factual occurrence in the historical sense of a singular event, nor is it factual in the philosophic sense of a necessary or demonstrative truth.[21] Poetic truth thus consists in a mode of possibility—that is, plausibility—which differs sharply from persuasiveness as rhetorical truth and from the predicational necessity which constitutes the truth of logic. It must finally be noted that these meanings for truth appropriate to different modes of symbolic analysis must be set off from the truth appropriate to the philosophic disciplines in the strict sense.

After this topical survey of Aristotle's notion of the relation of the principal kinds of symbolic analyses to philosophy, we can turn to St. Thomas's solution to the same problem.

St. Thomas, in his commentaries both on *On Interpretation* and on the *Posterior Analytics,* begins by noting that the single condition of all science and art is the complex of intellectual operations which sets off men from the rest of the animals. There are three consequences of this approach: (*a*) Logic itself becomes a science or an art; (*b*) the parts of logic will be divided in terms of the diversity of intellectual operations; and (*c*) the organization of the sciences will depend upon the different kinds of intellectual operations, intelligible objects, and the possible kinds of employment to which the understanding can put its knowledge.[22] Each of these consequences must now be established.

St. Thomas Aquinas insists that man is properly characterized by his employment of reasoned judgments.[23] This means that the function of reason is twofold: to direct the passions and to direct itself. These purposes taken together indicate that the end of all rational activity is the facile completion of all activities which are uniquely human. The reflection of reason on its own activities is the proper activity for reason, as opposed to translating knowledge into social or political activity or into artistic production. Parenthetically and without any

[20] *Poetics,* 9. 1451a38.

[21] "It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics or indeed any other art" (*ibid.,* 24. 1460b13-15).

[22] *ST,* I, q. 14, a. 16.

[23] *In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 1.

[24] *ST,* I, q. 93, a. 1.

[25] *Ibid.,* q. 14, a. 2.

[26] *Ibid.,* q. 93, a. 7.

[27] *In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 1.

[28] *De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 1.

[29] *De Anima* iii. 4. 430a20.

[30] *De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 1.

[31] *Ibid.,* q. 3, a. 5, ad 1.

further elaboration it should be noted that the ground of this assertion is the fact that man, according to St. Thomas, is made to the image and likeness of God,[24] in whom there is no distinction between knower and object known.[25] Consequently, that activity in which the object and the power most nearly approximate each other will be the content of the divine image in man. This activity is reason reflecting on its own operations.[26]

St. Thomas holds that arts and sciences arise out of the reflection of reason on any given set of activities. Thus, when reason reflects on the activities of building, the result is the art of carpentering, which, in virtue of its origins in reason, becomes a guide to correct building and a source of order for the builder. In addition to all such arts, St. Thomas insists that "a certain art is necessary which will be directive of the activities of reason itself, through which man can proceed easily, properly, and without error in the very act of reason. And this is the logical art, that is, rational science . . . which seems to be the art of arts because it directs us in the act of reason from which all the arts proceed."[27]

Reason has a single end, the acquisition of truth, to which it directs all its operations. Hence, if logic is the reflexive art or science of reason which has truth as its end, the division of logic into parts will correspond, in a one-for-one relation, with the loci and criteria of truth, which in turn are determined by the diverse operations of the mind.

St. Thomas defines truth as "the adequation of mind and thing,"[28] with the consequence that truth is found primarily in the mind and secondarily in things and verbal enunciations. It would be fair to say that by adequation St. Thomas intends to convey the Aristotelian notion that in the act of knowing the knower becomes the known in some qualified way.[29] Yet this is not all. For the notion of adequation involves not only some sort of identity of faculty and object but also a relation of dependence such that the identification of the mind with its object depends upon the existence of an object to which the mind can literally conform. Moreover, all natural objects are also said to be true[30] because they conform to the divine mind merely by existing.[31]

Here, then, there are parallel hierarchies of truths and existences

which converge in the simplicity of God as both the terminal point and the origin of created things and truths."[32] Another way of saying this is to note that "all truths are true in virtue of a First Truth."[33]

The significance of the Thomistic notion of truth, for purposes here, has two consequences. First, since logic is the reflexive art or science of reason, and since reason has as its end the acquisition of truth which in turn depends upon The First Truth, logic will have as its primary end the discrimination of truth from falsity. Secondly, because an ontological order parallels the hierarchy of truths, the modes of truth and the modes of acquiring it will parallel the ontological order of intelligible entities. Thus, the distinction which Aristotle makes about events as to being necessary, normal, or rare[34] will for St. Thomas be parallel to the characterization of truth as necessary, probable, or improbable.[35] The second function which St. Thomas attributes to logic is the construction or destruction of arguments based on probable or seemingly probable truths.[36]

The upshot of the foregoing distinction is that St. Thomas divides Aristotelian logic into two main divisions—the parts dealing with knowledge or unconditional truth and the parts dealing with probability or conditioned truth. The *Categories, On Interpretation,* and the *Analytics* comprise the first division; the *Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric,* and *Poetics* comprise the second. In sum, logic as a rational science has two parts, the necessary or demonstrative and the probable or conditioned. When logic is viewed in relation to the particular substantive sciences, each of these parts is functionally described in a double set of terms as *docens* and as *utens.*[37] Each of the particular sciences, metaphysics excluded, has a double concern: the discovery of its appropriate principles and a demonstrative movement from its appropriate premises. With respect to the discovery of principles, the method used is dialectical; and in this sense dialectic is to be considered as *docens.* However, if the dialectical inquiry does not terminate in necessary first principles but remains in the area of prob-

[32] *ST,* I, q. 65, a. 1.
[33] *De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 8.
[34] *Physics* ii. 4. 196b10-16.
[35] *In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 1.
[36] *In de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1.
[37] *Ibid.* St. Thomas credits Averroes with having made the distinction between *logica utens* and *logica docens.*
[38] *In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 20.
[39] *In IV Metaphys.,* lect. 4.
[40] *In de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1.
[41] *ST,* I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 1; q. 67, a. 2, ad 2.
[42] *In de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1.

able argumentation, then dialectic as a part of logic is to be considered as *utens;* and in this sense dialectic is a kind of independent science set off from demonstrative or philosophical science. The difference is that dialectic as an independent discipline can make probable proofs or determinations with respect to the subject matter of a particular science, whereas the particular science would make the same proofs demonstratively.[38] In order for the particular sciences to proceed demonstratively from their appropriate basic truths, certain canons of procedure must be employed which are specified in the demonstrative part of logic, and in this sense the demonstrative part of logic (*Categories, On Interpretation,* and *Analytics*) must be conceived as *docens.* Since the demonstrative canons cannot be employed in making determinations or proofs concerning a kind of substance independently of a particular substantive discipline, there is no independent science or *utens* function of the demonstrative part of logic.[39] Yet this is not to say that the canons of demonstrative procedure cannot be tested. On the contrary, this is precisely one of the principal functions of metaphysics; and it is in this sense that St. Thomas notes that the subject matter of logic and metaphysics are the same.[40] An interesting sign of the shift which is here made by St. Thomas is found in his concern for the truth value of the examples Aristotle uses in the logic. In several places[41] he warns that the examples should not be taken seriously since they represent only the probable opinions of other philosophers and not those of Aristotle himself.

Clearly, Aristotle did not conceive of *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* as parts of logic. Yet their inclusion is justified by St. Thomas on the ground that the function of both is to induce conviction through the use of probabilities, signs, and symbolic representations as opposed to the self-evidency asserted of unqualified truth. But precisely because sign, representation, and so on, condition or mediate truth, it belongs to logic to investigate them.

It is important to note that within such a framework the relation between the necessary and the probable is heuristic in the sense that the examination and employment of the probable is a preparation for the discovery and use of necessary truths.[42] Put in another way, St.

Thomas sees a continuity in the parts of logic which at the same time reflects the intellectual constitution of the knower.

According to St. Thomas, the knowledge process has three essential aspects.[43] The first aspect is the understanding of what he calls "indivisibles,"[44] through which one understands what a thing is. This doctrine involves the difficulty of whether an essence can be completely understood—a difficulty which cannot be discussed within the limits of this paper. What is important here is that St. Thomas insists that Aristotle's book of *Categories* pertains not to simple forms of expression[45] but rather to the intentional elements of the understanding. Because the content of the mind and the corresponding operation are simple, St. Thomas finds no possibility of error in the understanding of indivisibles.

The second operation of the mind is the composition of such indivisibles in affirmative or negative propositions. Composition itself, inasmuch as it is complex, involves the possibility of error. St. Thomas, thus, asserts that *On Interpretation* is concerned with the simples the mind has apprehended qua their function as parts of an enunciation.[46] The problem of *On Interpretation*, as St. Thomas sees it, is to delimit the conditions of propositions which command assent because of the very structure of the proposition, as opposed to dialectical or sophistical propositions which are probable or seem so, and also as opposed

[43] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 1.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] To be sure, Aristotle holds that there are categories of thought and existence; but the very definition of a logical category as "every expression which is in no way complex signifies substance, quantity" (*Categories* 2. 1b25) involves a distinction among the term, its signification, and that which it signifies. Because of this distinction it can be asserted that Aristotle's concern in the *Categories* is not with signification or with the content of mind but only with the analysis of terms as symbols of signification.

[46] For Aristotle the problem of *On Interpretation* is with the conditions for the discovery, formulation, and testing of single propositions as contrasted with the problem of the *Categories*, which is the search for simple forms of expression. Evidence for this interpretation of Aristotle can be taken from the fact that the entire delineation of the schema of contradictories and contraries follows upon, and rests on, the criteria for identifying a proposition which is single (*On Interpretation* 7. 18a13-15).

[47] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 7.

[48] *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 17.

[49] *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 4.

[50] It is important to note that *ens rationis* is called the proper subject matter of logic because of St. Thomas's insistence on logic as the reflexive art of reason which directs reason's activities. To put the matter in another way, the subject matter of logic is determined by St. Thomas's epistemological orientation of the problem as opposed to Aristotle's uniquely terminological formulation of logical questions. It would hence not be true for Aristotle to say that *ens rationis* is the subject matter of logic. Cf. *In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.

[51] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

:o rhetorical or poetic propositions, the truth value of which depends :o a large exent upon the dispositions of the hearer.[47]

The third operation of the mind is ratiocination or the discursive movement of the mind from propositions which are known to be true o propositions whose truth content is unknown. According to St. Thomas all the remaining books of the *Organon* plus rhetoric and poetic are dedicated to this problem. The discovery, however, of the unknown is nothing other than the problem of art and science.

Two problems now are presented. How is logic differentiated from he other arts and sciences? How are the other arts and sciences liferentiated from each other?

Since according to St. Thomas logic is concerned with the acts of reason, and reason is concerned with all existing things, logic will, in a sense, be coextensive with the subject of all philosophy.[48] The difference causally expressed lies in the fact that philosophy, properly called, is concerned with all the causes, whereas the logician is concerned only with the material and formal causes; that is, with the intrinsic or quidditative causes.[49] This distinction can also be expressed in terms of first and second intentions, where logic deals with the modes of predication of second intentions—for instance, genus, species and so on—while philosophy deals with first intentions or the existence of things.[50]

For St. Thomas knowledge arises out of experience, and what is experienced is the world of nature. Hence, if the sciences and arts are to be constructed in terms of the conditions set down in logic, which deals with the operations of the mind, the possibility of a schema of diverse sciences will depend upon the possibility of differentiating intellectual modes of understanding the simples or the essences of things which are to be the principles of science.

The doctrine of abstraction is the solution which St. Thomas offers.[51] This doctrine has two aspects. First, it asserts that the world of nature is constituted in terms of form and matter, substance and accident, and that form is the principle of intelligibility; and, secondly, this in turn allows for a consideration of a substance abstracting from its accidents as well as a consideration of an accidental form apart from the substance in which it inheres. The first abstraction reveals the universal

implicit in the particular, and this operation is proper to physics as a science but common to all the disciplines; the second abstraction is that of a part from the whole and is proper to mathematics.

Abstraction, thus, is an intellectual process which reveals the constitutive principles of a given nature either essentially or partitively. But just as in nature the union of essential principles results in an existent object, so, conversely, the intellectual concern for being or existence turns on an act of affirming or denying a union of essential principles. Hence, the intellectual act of affirmation or denial which St. Thomas calls "separatio,"[53] with its concern for existence and its conditions, establishes the science of metaphysics.

[52]*Ibid.*

[53]*Metaphysics* E. 1. 1025b25-28.

[54]*Ibid.*, 29-31.

[55]An excellent example of this tripartite concern is found in the *De Anima* ii. 1. 412b10-12: "We have now given an answer to the question what is soul?—an answer which applies to it in its full extent. *It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence*" (italics mine). The more general formulation of the tripartite concern of science is formulated in the *Posterior Analytics* i. 9. 76b11-16: "For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: that which it posits, the subject genus whose essential attributes it examines; the so-called axioms, which are primary premises of its demonstration; the attributes, the meaning of which it assumes."

[56]*In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 1. It is true that for Aristotle the diverse speculative disciplines do have diverse modes of definition, but the diversity of the science is due to differences in the subject matter of the science which in turn determine the appropriate modes of definition rather than the converse. Cf. *De Anima* ii. 1. 413a23-415a27.

[57]"I reply that the object of any cognitive habit has two aspects: what is materially known, which is, thus, the material object, and through which it is known, which is the formal cause (*ratio*) of the object. Thus in the science of geometry the conclusions are known materially, but the formal causes through which the conclusions are known are the middle terms of the demonstration" (*ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 1). This text is quoted fully in order to suggest that the common textbook notion of the material object of a science does not appear to correspond in any exact way with St. Thomas's notion of the material object.

[58]*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 3; *ST*, II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3.

[59]*In de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2.

[60]*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 3.

[61]This point can be best substantiated by considering the causal character of the nexus appropriate to the different kinds of proof. For all the causes in demonstrative science must be eternal (*Posterior Analytics* i. 1. 71b15), but especially the first causes which "exist separately and are immoveable" (*Metaphysics* E. 1. 1026a16). However, the causes appropriate to the arts are by no means eternal; rather, their necessity springs from the assumption of purpose generated by the contingencies of action and passion. It is this difference which allows Aristotle to note that "precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions . . . for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasonings from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs" (*Ethics* i. 1. 1094b13-28). Aristotle also differentiates between an unqualified end—the purposes of contemplation—and the end appropriate

The difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas in the matter of differentiating the speculative sciences comes sharply into focus by the examination of a passage in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle is discussing whether or not physics is a speculative discipline. Having said that every intellectual activity is either practical or productive or speculative, Aristotle notes that "physics will be a speculative science, but speculative about that kind of being which can be moved and for the most part only about that kind of formulated substance which does not exist independently of matter."[53] He adds then that "it is also necessary not to disregard how the essence and the verbal formula of such substances exist, for if these things are not also considered, the inquiry accomplishes nothing."[54] Aristotle's inclusion of the essence and its verbal formula here simply manifests the conviction that every science has these concerns[55] and that this inclusion is by no means to hold true only for speculative disciplines. But St. Thomas in commenting on this passage reads this inclusion as indicating that "the diversity in speculative sciences follows upon the diversity in the modes of definition."[56] Elsewhere St. Thomas expresses the same conviction by noting that the sciences as intellectual habits can be differentiated in terms of their formal objects which have reference to the middle terms of the demonstrations, as opposed to their material objects which have reference to the conclusions reached in the disciplines.[57]

What characterizes the speculative disciplines for St. Thomas is the fact that the objects about which there is speculative knowledge conversely cannot be made by the knower with the aid of that knowledge. Put in another way, knowledge which cannot be or is not translatable into action or production is speculative.[58] While such a notion "excludes logic as a principal part of speculative philosophy,"[59] it is clear that St. Thomas allows for speculative sciences about things which can be made by man. If, for example, "an artist considers a house by investigating its properties, genus, and differences"[60]—which is considering something which can be made but not qua makeable—such knowledge is speculative.

It need hardly be said that for Aristotle a speculative art is a self-contradiction.[61] Nor would Aristotle understand what it means to say

that a given science is both speculative and practical "but more speculative than practical,"[62] which is the way St. Thomas describes the science of sacred doctrine. It should be noted, however, that St. Thomas Aquinas holds that this is peculiar to sacred doctrine and that this description would not hold of a philosophic discipline, for there can "be no speculative prudence."[63]

The point to be made is simply this, that if the sciences are organized in terms of the conditions set down in the logic and if logic is concerned with the acts or operations of the mind, then the sciences must also be differentiated in the same terms. Moreover, each act of the mind springs from a corresponding power, "but powers are differentiated by acts and objects."[64] Since the activity of reason is understanding and since from this point of view it is accidental whether the knowledge is translated into action or not, it follows that there is no essential distinction between reason qua speculative and reason qua practical. Inasmuch as such sciences are distinguished, they are differentiated in terms of their respective ends. This means that the same subject matter may be either speculative or productive, or, in the case of sacred theology, both practical and speculative, depending upon the ends to which reason directs its knowledge—granted of course that not all knowledge can be directed to every kind of end. Thus the problem for St. Thomas is a hierarchy of ends and a consequent hierarchization of the various sciences, with the

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to action and production which are ends only in 'a particular relation or end of a particular operation (*ibid.*, i. 1. 1139a28-1139b5).

[62] *ST*, I, q. 1, a. 5.

[63] *Ibid.*, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.

[64] *Ibid.*, q. 77, a. 3.

[65] *CG*, cap. 3.

[66] *ST*, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

[67] *Metaphysics*, E. 1. 1026a20-24; A. 2. 983a1-11.

[68] "Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, nature always strives after 'the better'. Now 'being' (we have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than 'not-being'; but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source'. God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being. The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous. That, too, is why all the other things—the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their 'passions' and their 'powers of action', e.g., the 'simple' bodies—imitate circular motion" (*On Generation and Corruption* ii. 10. 336b25-337a5).

result that the arts exist for the sake of science; and among the sciences, the practical are ordered to the speculative,[65] which include sacred doctrine, to which all knowledge is ordered.[66]

It is true that Aristotle says that the speculative sciences ought to be preferred to the other sciences and that metaphysics or first philosophy ought to be chosen in preference to the other speculative disciplines. But this preference arises out of the nobility of the subject matter and not out of any notion of a literal ordering of the parts of knowledge.[67]

In sum, it seems clear that a literal hierarchy of the sciences, such as St. Thomas proposes, is foreign to the Aristotelian doctrine of independent but interrelated disciplines. Moreover, the notion of hierarchies both in nature and thought are certainly more akin to Platonic dialectic than to Aristotelian analytic. But to simply state the difference in this form is to invite the contradictory of the confusion which this paper is intended to clarify. If it is inadequate to account for the likenesses between Aristotle and St. Thomas by simple hyphenation, it is equally an oversimplification to state their differences by calling St. Thomas a Platonist.

On the contrary, the source of the terminological ambiguity lies in St. Thomas's formulation of principles similar to those of Aristotle but put to different employments, and the insertion of non-Aristotelian principles having apparently Aristotelian functions. For purposes here, all that can be done in the way of clarification is the suggestion of topics which, when comparatively viewed, are indicative of this assertion.

Since Aristotle and St. Thomas both look to nature, its operations, and products for a philosophic point of departure, it seems likely that their respective views of nature itself will differ and account in part for the diversity in scientific organization.

The Aristotelian universe, made up of substances sensible and non-sensible, mutable and immutable, has a quasi-unity effected through imitation. For the eternal circular motion, characteristic of the prime mover, is imitated in the continuity of physical change through the reciprocal transformation of the elements.[68] What must be noted is that the ground of this imitation is motion itself and not any shared or participated principle of constitution. This means that in respect to

their essential constitution the diverse natures constituting the universe remain independent but related through the perpetuity of process in its several forms and meanings.

In the sense of coming to know, knowledge of Aristotle's universe is itself a natural process.[69] In the sense of actual knowledge possessed by a knower, it is a relation of identity between knower and known;[70] and in the sense of a particular content, such as mathematical knowledge, it is to be regarded as an attribute inhering in the knower,[71] which, when conceived as a habit, is itself a principle of process,[72] in this case mathematicizing.

In the *De Anima*[73] Aristotle notes that each thing, insofar as it is able, participates in the eternal and the divine. The possibility of such participation is qualified, however, by the composition of physical nature with its attendant limitation, time. Knowledge, then, as a process like other processes participates in the eternal by way of imitation. If, however, knowledge is viewed as a relation of identity between the knower and the known and if what is known is the noble and the divine, the problem becomes complex. The alternatives are either that reason as a ruler and guide of nature in the sense of the principle of action and passion is itself divine and consequently at least part of nature directly and constitutively participates in the divine, or else that human reason is simply the godlike element within us which can be functionally analogized to what is absolutely eternal and divine.[74]

[69]*Metaphysics* A. 1. 980a22-981a5.

[70]*De Anima* iii. 4. 430a20.

[71]*Categories* 7. 8b29.

[72]*Ethics* vi. 1. 1139b14-18.

[73]ii. 3. 415a29.

[74]*Ethics* x. 6. 1177a15-16.

[75]The controversy as to whether Averroes or St. Thomas is the most faithful Aristotelian on the question of the status of the agent intellect would achieve added intelligibility if the commentaries on the *Analytics* were viewed as more integral parts of this question, because for Aristotle the connection between scientific expression and causal knowledge must be a relation of identity if demonstration is to be possible. Consequently, shifts in epistemology would necessarily reflect themselves in the introduction of new analytic distinctions or the restatement of given distinctions with novel emphases or employments.

[76]*Posterior Analytics* ii. 19. 100a4-100b17.

[77]"It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to be sure whether one's knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute—the differentia of true knowledge. We think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and primary premises. But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with the basic facts of the science" (*ibid.*, i. 8. 76a26-30).

[78]*Metaphysics* Λ. 8. 1074b34.

[79]*ST*, I, q. 65, a. 1.

[80]*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 4.

Part of the evidence which can be offered to show Aristotle's inclination in the matter of these alternatives must be taken from the canons of scientific expression which Aristotle formulates to guide reason in the discovery and articulation of its knowledge.[75] His insistence on the natural movement from sense experience to understanding of first principles,[76] which takes place in time and incurs both the difficulty of knowing when we know[77] as well as the possibility of forgetfulness and the natural intermittancy of contemplation, seems to argue against the identification of human reason with the eternal and divine. Secondly, the stated necessity for univocal expression in the formulation of diverse first principles appropriate to different subject matters would certainly be an incongruous mode of discourse for a mind directly participating in "thought thinking on thought."[78]

In contrast to Aristotle's doctrine of imitation is St. Thomas's notion of participation as the basic relation between God and creation. Each thing qua its existence, in contradistinction to its essence, exists because it participates in the essence of God.[79] The character of the participation is determined by the constitutive capacity of a thing to receive existence; that is, its essence. Thus, the variety of things not only denotes the conditions of operational differences but also a hierarchy of possible and real perfections.

Knowledge of a world which is unified in origin and purpose by God is itself a participation in God, since the universe is a manifestation not only of God's power but especially of his creative wisdom. But human knowledge, like all other created things, is qualified by the conditions of essential receptivity. In effect, this dual condition means that God is not only the ultimate efficient principle of nature but also the ultimate formal and final principle of the knowledge of nature; further, not only is actual knowledge a participation in the essence of God, but also the intellectual faculties themselves are such because of a participation in a superior intellect.[80] The doctrine of participation, thus, is a base for a series of relations of proportion between nature and knowledge, knower and known, and the different kinds of natures and knowers.

For St. Thomas every philosophic expression of necessity involves a dual aspect, the univocal specification of a given nature or property,

and the proportional character of the known and the knower to the first principle of existence and knowledge, God. These two conditions taken together account for St. Thomas's insistence that what is first known is *ens*, upon which all other principles, including the principle of noncontradiction, are based.[81] The significance of this doctrine arises from the fact that it is *ens* which is the ground of the schema of transcendental attributes; and it is the transcendental attributes, such as good and true, which belong to every substance, which allow for a basic analogy of proportion to be established among nature, minds, principles, activities, and sciences—a proportion which establishes a continuous hierarchy in nature and thought which rises to an identity in God.

What has been suggested here is that the basic view of nature, its operations, and products is not the same in Aristotle and St. Thomas; and despite terminological sameness, differences in principles and their employments radically set these two philosophers apart. The notion of imitation in Aristotle does not have an equivalent function in St. Thomas. This is in fact due to St. Thomas's argument from faith that the world is not eternal.[83] Yet this doctrine does not preclude St. Thomas's use of the concept of imitation in another context. St. Thomas discusses the act of contemplation in terms of three kinds of motion—circular, rectilinear, and oblique.[84] Oblique motion refers to divine illumination in reasoning, whereas the first or circular in the comprehension of principles and the rectilinear motion refer to the discursive part of contemplation. There is, moreover, in this context a contrast drawn between the contemplation of human beings and the understanding of angels, who have only simple intuition and no need of the discursive processes. Thus the function of imitation which Aristotle found in the kinds of physical motion is translated by St.

[81] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

[83] *Ibid.*, I, q. 46, a. 2. In this connection it might be well to remark on what I regard as perhaps the most fundamental difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas. For Aristotle philosophy consists in causally analyzing every process and that which comes to be as a result of process irrespective of the subject initiating the process or the object of the process. St. Thomas, however, does not and cannot hold this. For the doctrine of creation cannot be causally analyzed in Aristotle's sense, and surely this doctrine makes a profound impression and gives a sense of direction to St. Thomas's philosophy of nature.

[84] *ST*, II-II, q. 180, a. 6.

[84] *Ethics* x. 6. 1177a18.

[85] *Phaedo* 64a.

Thomas into the diversification of intellectual natures and their appropriate operations.

It is clear that this doctrinal shift helps to obviate Aristotle's problem of the ontological status of reason. But it also involves another consequence. The analogy of proportion, which for St. Thomas puts the diverse kinds of intelligences and their appropriate kinds of knowledge into a quasi-continuum, is mediated on the part of God by creation and revelation, and approximated on the part of man by inquiry and activity. This in turn means that for St. Thomas philosophy itself, like the nature from which it springs, cannot properly be looked to for what Aristotle called "final happiness"[84] but is rather to be seen as a dialectical approximation of revealed wisdom, or as Socrates put it, "a search for death."[85]

Reverend Philippo Selvaggi, S.J. (Gregorian University); for the second, the Reverend Canon Franz Grégoire (Louvain) and Professor Sophia Vanni Rovighi (Sacro Cuore, Milan); for the third, the Reverend Canon Albert Dondeyne (Louvain) and the Reverend Giorgio Giannini (Lateran, Rome). These men did a brilliant job with the very difficult situation of quite disparate papers and managed to give an outline that was both fair and clear.

Because of the very disparate nature of both the papers and the discussions,[2] general observations on the themes are very difficult to offer. On the first theme, it might be said that for the most part the authors as well as those attending the congress agreed that modern science is a different kind of knowledge from philosophy, though there were some notable exceptions to this generalization. For the rest, it must suffice to point out some of the more interesting or significant papers.

Some individual papers deserve mention. The Reverend Guérard des Lauriers, O.P., proposed that we must divide the human knowledge of material things into three classes; that is, in addition to philosophy of nature and natural science, there are "metasciences." This notion came in for some questioning, and few were entirely ready to accept it.

On the second theme, the Reverend Cornelio Fabro, C.P.S., wrote on Thomistic being and Hegelian being, and Franz Grégoire on Hegelian themes and Thomistic conclusions. These two papers deserve detailed study. Auguste Etcheverry, S.J., argued that a materialism could not be really dialectical, making a good point about the intentional nature of a dialectical process.

On the third theme, the number of excellent papers was larger. Canon Dondeyne stressed the problems raised by atheistic existentialism. Reverend Joseph de Finance, S.J., discussed Sartre's denial of potency and its consequences for his philosophy. Régis Jolivet contrasted the Thomistic method and existential phenomenology. The Reverend Benoit Pruche, O.P., showed the experiential basis for a Thomistic philosophy of existence. Canon Georges van Riet discussed evidence in the light of contemporary phenomenology. Raymundus Verdado, O.P., stressed the function of the concrete singular existent in Thomism.

As a special point, the Reverend Roberto Busa, S.J., reported that his project for an "Index Thomisticus" on IBM cards was making progress. He told the congress that the first step of the indexing of the *Summa Theologiae* was completed and might be available for use by scholars within the next four years. The *Contra Gentiles* and *De Veritate* are also planned. Whether

[2]These discussions are planned to be published, along with some papers which arrived too late for inclusion in the first volume of the acts of the congress, in a second volume that will be published in 1956.

the *Opera Omnia* will be carded (this is expected to require twelve million cards) will depend somewhat on the usefulness of the index previously made out.

The Second International Conference on Patristic Studies was held at Christ Church, Oxford, 19-24 September, 1955. Among the more than four hundred participants were many eminent scholars from the Continent and the Northern countries, as well as some from America. The conference was well organized by Doctor F. L. Cross of Christ Church. There were full sessions with papers and discussions, master themes, and particular communications.

As is to be expected from the nature of the topic as well from the interests of the majority of the participants, many of the papers turned on classical and theological points. Only one of the full sessions was devoted to philosophy, a lecture by Professor A. Dempf (Munich), on new methods of the investigation of patristic philosophy—and this session was very poorly attended. Professor Dempf urged the application of the comparative method to patristic philosophy, suggesting that the classification into types would be of great value in the analysis of individual fathers. Some of his hearers felt that the method could easily become one of subjective interpretation.

Among the master themes, one was devoted to the fathers and Hellenistic philosophy. On the four days, two hours were given to a paper and subsequent discussion. Topics were: "Boethius and the Claims of Philosophy," by W. Schmid (Bonn); "Citations of Plato by the Fathers," by E. Des Places, S.J. (Biblical Institute, Rome); "Augustine's Philosophy of Beauty," by R. Berlinger (Munich); "A Vocabulary of Marius Victorinus Afer," by P. Hadot (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France). The last three papers were primarily philological; the philosophical values were scarcely exploited. Professor Schmid's paper examined the description of Philosophy and her patient in the beginning of the *Consolatio;* he maintained that this was a traditional allegory, intended by Boethius to reveal the nature and function of philosophy. In the discussion, Mlle. M. T. D'Alverny (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris) showed that this description coincided with traditional manuscript illuminations depicting divine wisdom. If her study on this point (to be published this winter) will be probative, it will show that the *Consolatio* is not only Christian but perhaps even theological from the start.

Among the communications, only a few took up philosophical points. L. Minio-Paluello (Oxford) summarized our present knowledge of Boethius as commentator and translator of Aristotle; H.-I. Marrou showed that for St. Augustine there can be no third kingdom in addition to the City of God and the City of This World, though there are natural elements that are not

evil in themselves. The Reverend Michael Schmaus (Munich) gave part of the history of the Augustinian psychological trinities, maintaining that only Erigena and Ratramnus made any profound use of them. B. M. G. Reardon (Devon, England) asserted that for St. Augustine philosophy has a valid role as preparatory to the faith and functions within faith as giving the meaning of the truth. D. A. Callus, O.P. (Blackfriars, Oxford) described a manuscript of Dionysius (Ms. 97, Bodleian) which has annotations by Grosseteste.

The textual and historical papers given at Oxford were generally of a very high order, indicating that these studies are practiced there widely and well. It was, however, a shock to discover the lack of interest in philosophy. This refers partly to the paucity of philosophical papers but much more to what appeared to be lacunae in other papers. Thus there was a full discussion of symbolism, a master theme on Christology, and many communications on speculative theological points, in which pertinent philosophical considerations were simply ignored. Theological interpretation was often metaphorical (with no rational justification) and sometimes almost purely nominalistic.

Three related problems demand a solution in contemporary terms: reason and faith, positive and speculative theology, scientific and symbolic knowledge. It would seem that the co-operative effort of philosophers and theologians could do something about these problems; unless they are solved, new catastrophes threaten theological thought.

The papers read at this conference are to be published by a German publisher. Further details will be forthcoming later.

The Association for Realistic Philosophy held its fall meeting at Cambridge (Mass.) on November 5. In the morning session papers were read by Robert W. Jordan (University of New Hampshire) on "Intentionality in Aesthetic Analysis," and William Walton (St. Joseph's College) on "A Realistic Concept of Truth Statements." In the afternoon session there was a discussion, "Some Problems for Realistic Philosophy," led by Oliver Martin (University of Rhode Island), William A. Gerhard (Brooklyn College), and Robert C. Baldwin (University of Connecticut).

The Eleventh Congress of Christian Philosophy took place at the Center of Philosophical Studies of Gallarate (Italy), September 5 to September 7, 1955. Members of the congress are the professors of philosophy of the Italian universities. This year an international flavor was imparted by the presence of guest participants from other countries: Adolfo Munoz Alonso (Murcia, Spain), Fritz J. von Rintelen (Mainz, Germany), Reverend Herman-Leo Van Breda, O.F.M. (Louvain), Manuel Mindàn (Istituto Superiore Vivés, Madrid), Reverend Joseph Defever, S.J. (St.

John Berchmans, Louvain), Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis University), and Reverend Jean Langlois, S.J. (Montreal and Heythrop, England).

The theme of the congress was phenomenology. The discussions were preceded by three papers. Professor Paolo Filiasi Carcano (Naples) took the view that phenomenological method could not be separated from the philosophical systems in which it was concreted, and qualified phenomenology as antimetaphysical, positivistic, and materialistic. The Reverend Francesco Morandini, S.J. (Gregorian University), took the view that phenomenological method could be separated from its historical forms and that it was essentially compatible with truly metaphysical systems; he considered phenomenology to be methodologically a renouncing of all preconceptions and an appeal to the facts. The Reverend Herman-Leo Van Breda, O.F.M. (Louvain), gave a historical exposition of the later trends of Husserl's thought, bringing out with admirable clarity Husserl's desire for a realistic metaphysics.

The remainder of the three days was spent in discussion, under the capable chairmanship of Carolo Giacon, S.J., secretary of the center. Most of the Italian professors present follow some form of Christian spiritualism or personalism, and the method of this philosophy is that of an a-priori analysis of the thinking subject. Hence it was not surprising that most of them were rather strongly opposed to phenomenology. The discussions bore on the nature and applications of the phenomenological method, especially on its first phase, the "Wesensanschau"—the elaborated description of what is perceived. A few conceded that such a description, principally because of its attempt to avoid all preconceptions, could have a negative value in destroying errors and prejudices. Many were dubious even about this value. They thought that phenomenology in its historical sense was closed to any transcendental reality (God and the soul) and restricted to the immediate data of consciousness. They maintained also that since phenomenology began with the particular, it could never reach any universal and necessary truths. Father Van Breda and Professor von Rintelen tried to make it clear that the second objection could not correctly be urged against Husserl, since he was concerned with essences, not with the particular as such. Father Van Breda explained that Husserl was strongly opposed to the formal deduction of the Neo-Kantians, and that he was scarcely concerned to refute positivism, of which he had really very little knowledge. But the personalists did not accept this explanation. The true nature of spirit, they asserted, could be reached only by an analysis of pure consciousness, taken absolutely (that is, without regard to any particular object).

Unfortunately, the notion of an analogical application of phenomenological method was not made use of.

The spirit of the congress was marked by a warm friendliness and by open, free discussion. For this, the participants, and especially the chairman, deserve great credit.

The Mountain-Plains Philosophical Conference held its tenth annual meeting at Colorado A. & M. College, October 13-15, 1955. The three major papers were given by Hazel E. Barnes ("Philosophy of Education"), Bruce Waters ("Philosophy of History"), and Joseph N. Uemura ("Philosophy of Religion"). One discussant was appointed for each of these papers.

The Reverend Paul Henry, s.j., Professor of Theology at the Institute Catholique of Paris, is visiting Professor of Philosophy at Iowa State University, during the second semester of 1955-56. He will also be available for lectures at other schools.

Heidegger in France

THOMAS D. LANGAN, *Institut Catholique, Paris*

The first visit of Martin Heidegger to France was the occasion of a unique opportunity to see the basic movement of his thought reveal itself under intense questioning. For eight days—from August 27 until September 4, 1955—as the guest of the Foyer Culturel International de Cerisy, situated in the Norman chateau of Cerisy-la-Salle, Heidegger exposed his ideas on the theme, "What is philosophy?"—employing lectures, seminars in the interpretation of selected texts of Kant and Hegel, and the interpretation of a newly-discovered poem of Hölderlin as the means of presentation. Responding to the continual questioning of the invited philosophers, Heidegger defended his position and in so doing provided ample opportunity for the characteristics of his thought to manifest themselves.

I

Objecting to efforts to characterize the "Heideggerian philosophy," Heidegger insisted that there is no "philosophy of Heidegger." This was no simple objection against the notion that there might be a "Heideggerian system"; Heidegger moreover insists that he has never himself responded to the traditional philosophical question, the question *nach dem Sein des Seiendem*, or, as it has also been formulated historically, the question of being qua being. Heidegger's effort has been preparatory to this question, an effort to question the traditional *horizon* in which the question has been asked and answered, an effort to explore the basis of metaphysics, to search

out the conditions under which the question can be answered in other than the truncated manner of the historical metaphysical systems. For traditionally the answer, different in each epoch, following the characteristic philosophical flavor (*Stimmung*) of the time, has always been in terms of a partial aspect of being (*Seiendes*) and has never constituted more than a partial, indirect, basically truncated revelation. The effort today, the contemporary *Stimmung* (and here Heidegger seems to reveal his own evaluation of his proper philosophic effort), is preparatory to a new and perhaps more fundamental revelation. Our efforts in questioning the traditional horizon within which the question of being has been answered prepare (1) to overcome the traditional overlooking of the vital distinction between being itself (*das Sein*) and individual beings and aspects of being (*Seiendes*); (2) an openness to, and readiness to accept, an important transformation of the traditional forgetfulness of the vital distinction. Heidegger's devotion to the task of preparation shows itself in his concentration upon the conditions of the *Leitfrage*, being qua being. In the course of the session at Cerisy, everything—historical analysis, the role of language and communication, the meaning of the interpretation of the *Dasein* (that is, the human existent)—was interpreted in terms of, and made to serve, the cause of the *Leitfrage*. This single-minded concentration of effort and successful employ of all of the philosopher's instruments was a revelation of the second characteristic of Heidegger's thought.

II

The *rigor* with which Heidegger employs his manner of inquiry concerning the horizon of the *Seinsfrage* shows itself not only in his successful exploitation of history, language, and phenomenological probing of the *Dasein*, but negatively as well in his refusal to be drawn by questioning beyond the preparatory stage to which his meditations have thus far brought him. An important instrument for evading questions which were lodged too far beyond the present stage of inquiry is Heidegger's position regarding *faith*. Heidegger seems very intent on maintaining in a pure form what might be called "the philosophical prerogative," the right to pose the audacious question, "Why is there anything rather than nothing at all?" and then to seek to answer it without the interference of faith—which of course would render the question without meaning. To maintain philosophy so-defined alive, Heidegger, it seems, would separate as sharply as possible the mental spheres of faith and philosophy, would assign faith a historical object (the redemption) and a practical end (fidelity to the Redeemer) and would have the philosopher left alone with his "audacious question" about the

meaning of being. The question of the relation of faith and philosophy was not directly treated at Cerisy, but the question of Heidegger's general position in the matter—basic to his attitude toward the mission and method of philosophy—is vital for an understanding of the philosopher's reaction toward the repeated efforts of Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricoeur, and Maurice de Gandillac to interject into the discussion subjects of Hebrew and Christian origin.[1] Thus, when Marcel objected that philosophy, properly speaking, must also consider problems of a later-than-Greek origin and cited *creation* as an example, Heidegger's only answer was that creation depends on the faith for its origin and meaning. De Gandillac countered with the example of real, noncyclical time, a notion, he said, of Christian origin but not dependent formally on the faith for its realization. Heidegger answered that the Greeks, too, had a notion of real, historical time—not the philosopher's, perhaps, but certainly that of a historian like Thucydides. This interchange seemed to reveal an uneasiness on Heidegger's part before the possibility that a properly philosophical contribution, a real advance in our knowledge of the fundamental constitution of being, might be forthcoming historically from the faith. Such a situation would militate against Heidegger's traditional sharp distinction and would cast doubt on a formulation which sees in a philosophization of the faith a betrayal of what faith stands for, and in the faith a condition impossible for philosophy.

The *depth* of Heidegger's method appears in the successful effort to wring ontological significance out of everything. For example, in explaining the role which the first published part of *Sein und Zeit* must play in relation to his entire thought, Heidegger explained that the phenomenological exploration of the *Dasein* could be considered an effort to explore the temporal horizon of the question of being. The great question which the *Zeitlichkeit* of this analysis has raised—whether or not *Sein und Zeit* by its method did not succeed in locking the question *nach dem Sein* hopelessly within a time-horizon too limited to permit an answer to the essential question—was unanswered by anything that transpired at Cerisy.

The depth of Heidegger's method appears above all in his dialogue with history, a dialogue which is a genuine communication, a profound search in history for traces of *das Sein*, an effort, termed in *Sein und Zeit*, perhaps

[1]See Henri Birault, "La Foi et la pensée d'après Heidegger," *Recherches et débats*, Cahier No. 10 (Mars 1955), (Paris: Librarie Sayard), upon which I base the summary statement of Heidegger's fundamental position in this matter.

[2]"Realism" is of course not employed here in the sense so rightly rejected by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* (7th ed. [Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953]), p. 207, in the sense of the acceptance of a provable reality, a reality that requires proving, but in the sense current in Thomistic circles of an openness through knowledge to an intelligible reality in which we find ourselves.

misleadingly, "the destruction of ontologies," to reveal the ontological limits of the historical inquiries and in so doing prepare the way for a fundamental criticism of the traditional horizon within which the question of being qua being has been answered.

The historical discussions and analyses at Cerisy, fecund and revealing a profound insight into the texts concerned, also tended, however, to underscore the suspicion of an important *lacuna* in Heidegger's historical knowledge. It has been written, "Heidegger, from his youngest days, has been schooled in the thought of St. Thomas." The philosopher himself speaks often of "the Scholastics" and often quotes familiar formulae from the Thomistic corpus. But Heidegger's interpretations of typical "Scholastic" texts at Cerisy were consistently Scotistic, and were—for example in connection with a discussion of the reversal of the concepts subject-object from the Middle Ages to Kant—employed to demonstrate the easy transition from "Scholastic thought" to Descartes. Heidegger tended to interpret *esse* as *existentia* in the sense of *realitas,* the most common quality adhering in all "subjects." But the most disturbing indication that Heidegger's insight into St. Thomas is limited came in a quick summary of the *Stimmungen* that have characterized the philosophical epochs to the present day. In the original Greek inquiry, being was identified with *logos,* in the sense of that which is expressible. Plato transformed *logos* into *idea;* Aristotle achieved the transformation to *energeia; energeia* became "in the Middle Ages" *actus purus* or *actualitas.* In the Renaissance the characteristic *Stimmung* saw being identified as *Gegenständlichkeit,* which in the nineteenth century becomes confused with *Wirklichkeit,* and this confusion itself is called by the name "*Realität.*" Viewed thus, bracketed between *energeia* on the one side and *Gegenständlichkeit* on the other, it is evident that the *Stimmung* of the Middle Ages must be for Heidegger at best a slight improvement or perhaps even a decline, but in any case no *essential* advance over an Aristotelian formalism—which indeed would support Heidegger's contention that all historical metaphysical efforts have succeeded only in viewing *das Sein* after the nature of one of its aspects.

III

One was struck at Cerisy, as one often is in the works of Heidegger, by the realism[2] of his motivation—the desire to know being as it is in itself—and by the realism of his methodological affirmations—that we must stand open before being, and in a *Hören* from the things that are come to the revelation of *das Sein.* And so, too, for the criticism of the ontologies of the past: they are castigated for a substitution of the "partially real"—an aspect

of being—for being itself. And yet, in its very inachievement, the thought of Heidegger carries with it an inevitable overtone of the *Ding-an-sich* mentality. To date in the writings of Martin Heidegger, being itself, the allurement of whose presence we somehow feel there, nevertheless in itself remains fundamentally hidden. As we hear Heidegger's criticism of the ontologies as constructions substituting an aspect of being for being itself, we wonder if he has come to see in these historical limitations an *essential* limit and necessary condition of the human discovery of being. In characterizing the *Stimmung* of today as a preparation for a move beyond the forgetting of the distinction between a *Seiendes* and *das Sein* itself, Heidegger would seem to be indicating the possibility of a more fundamental, more satisfactory access to being; but in the very formulation of the *Stimmung* as a *preparation* there lingers an apparent serious doubt of our ability to achieve a philosophical formulation of this experience.[3] A more genuine acquaintance with St. Thomas's efforts in this direction might aid Heidegger in answering the question whether *construction* is a necessary condition of the human quest for a philosophical expression of being.

The week at Cerisy, however, left no doubt whatsoever on one question: A dialogue with Martin Heidegger, in the sense of an *Entsprechen und Hören*, is one of the most satisfactory that a contemporary philosopher can enjoy.

Eighth Annual Meeting of the Missouri Philosophical Association

LINUS J. THRO, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

The Missouri State Philosophy Association met October 21-22 at Park College, Parkville, Mo. Following its established format, the meeting consisted principally of an afternoon session with three papers, the evening association dinner with the presidential address, and a morning symposium session.

Speaking Friday afternoon, John J. Kessler (Washington University, Saint Louis) linked semanticism with earlier skepticisms and invited philosophers to abandon speculative problems and join in the work of promoting social amity and economic betterment. Millie Bakan (Christian College, Columbia, Mo.) took her inspiration from Whitehead but felt she improved upon her mentor in maintaining a unity of the knowing subject as given and not made

[3]This statement should not pass as a prejudgment of the effort which Heidegger is just beginning and which seems to mark the next advance in his thought. It seems that he is centering his attention more and more on the implications of the difference between *das Sein* and the *Seiendes*, hoping to find, in a kind of negative research, what *das Sein* is *not*, in function of what the *Seiendes* are.

in experience and in establishing from the "telic aspect of experiencing" the ontological reality of a world of objects. The paper of Irving Sosensky (Washington University) was in large part a criticism of A. J. Ayer's criteria of immediacy.

The symposium session, in answer to the challenge made last year by the retiring president, Harold A. Durfee, was a valiant and in some degree successful effort to achieve a meeting of minds on the starting point of philosophical realism. The main paper, by the Reverend Robert J. Henle, S.J. (Saint Louis University), had been distributed in advance of the meeting; and, to judge by the earnest and generally perceptive comment evoked by it, it had been thoroughly studied. In his paper, Father Henle had first urged the necessity of starting afresh, unhampered by the prejudicial standards of evidence set up by the empiricist and rationalist traditions; then in a reflective consideration of the given of simple experiences, he presented the evidence for an undistorted knowledge of the intelligibility of being. To open the discussion, the appointed critics of the paper, Lewis Hahn (Washington University) and Arthur Berndtson (University of Missouri), while they expressed some measure of agreement with the position, emphasized difficulties, respectively from the point of view of the ambiguity of the original data and from that of the apparent need of universals before knowledge is possible. The discussion thus initiated did not of course terminate in a judicial decision, but it was generally felt that the fundamentals of the case for realism had been ably presented and defended and sympathetically heard.

President Huston Smith (Washington University) addressed the gathering on the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Sinic, the Indic and the Western cultures; he suggested the advisability of greater mutual appreciation, intercommunication and intelligent adaptation by each of the good in the others. The president elected for the coming year was Arthur Berndtson (University of Missouri), the secretary-treasurer, Donald C. Hodges (University of Missouri), being continued in office. The association accepted the invitation of Westminster College to hold its ninth annual meeting at Fulton; John A. Gates (Westminster) will be in charge of arrangements and chairman of the program committee.

NICHOLAS RESCHER

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Original text, Italian translation, critical introduction and notes by G. C. M. Colombo, S.J. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1954.

Father Colombo's book is a package that includes more than is promised by its label. Its contents include (1) an introduction of some 120 pages, (2) Bertrand Russell's *Introduction* to the English edition of the *Tractatus*, with facing Italian text, (3) some two-score *Notes*, (4) a brief discussion (in Italian) of the logical machinery of the *Tractatus* by M. Dummett of Oxford University, and finally (5) a list of Wittgenstein's writings and a bibliography of eighteen pieces dealing with his work. Before discussing the present volume, it is appropriate briefly to consider Wittgenstein's work in general and the *Tractatus* in particular.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889, and died on April 29, 1951. From 1930 to 1949, except for an interruption during the second World War, he lectured in philosophy at Cambridge University, where in 1939 he succeeded G. E. Moore to the Chair of Moral Philosophy and Logic. He published only two philosophical writings during his lifetime, the *Tractatus*, and a short article entitled "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, Suppl. Vol. IX [1929], pp. 162-71). Of this article Wittgenstein later spoke with disparagement, saying that he did not think it deserved any attention. The *Tractatus* first appeared in 1921 under the title *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* (*Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Vol. 14 [1921], pp. 185-262), and it appeared in the following year in an English translation, prepared by C. K. Ogden, with an introduction by Bertrand Russell (London, 1922). Wittgenstein continued to subject the matter of the *Tractatus* to re-examination, and to revise his views—indeed in 1929, in reply to queries as to the meaning of certain parts of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein said that he had forgotten what he had meant by the statements in question.

His two publications do not provide a full measure of the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophical work. This requires consideration of his unpublished, privately circulated lecture notes, the "Blue Book," the "Brown Book," the "Foundations of Mathematics," and above all the posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1953). These represent, in part, the fruits of some two decades of assiduous teaching and research at Cambridge, which served to orient and stimulate the growing British linguistic analysis movement and to establish Wittgenstein among the most influential philosophers of our day.

The *Tractatus* is of interest because it is a roadmark standing at the fork at which Wittgenstein's creative career touches on two important contemporary philosophical movements: logical positivism as fathered in Vienna and Berlin, and the linguistic analysis school inaugurated within groups at Oxford and Cambridge.

The heritage which logical positivism derived from the *Tractatus* includes:

1. The concept of an atomic proposition (*Elementarsatz*, 4.25 - 4.3) and the project of exhibiting that all statements—and in particular all of natural science—can be construed as truth-functioned complexes of atomic propositions (5.3).
2. The concept of a *tautology* (4.46) and a theory of meaning that identifies meaning with truth-conditions (*Wahrheitsbedingungen*) and has as a consequence that all tautologies have the same meaning—viz., none at all (that is, are *sinnlos*, 6.1 - 6.111).
3. The suggestion—which has played an important role in the logical positivists' treatment of induction—that the device of enumerating the various cases in which an expression of propositional logic is true can be used to define a purely logical measure of probability or degree of confirmation (5.1).

The *Tractatus* is also important, as mentioned, for understanding the development of Wittgenstein's subsequent characteristic position regarding philosophical methodology. Some of the theses adumbrated in the *Tractatus* that are of interest in this connection are:

1. That linguistic analysis is the proper tool of philosophical enquiry (4.0031, 4.112).
2. That philosophical enquiry does not result in an ability to *state* or *explain* (*aussagen*), but to *show* or *point out* (*zeigen*), language being incapable of formulating philosophical propositions (4.121, 6.53).
3. That philosophical enquiry does not *solve* or *answer* the problems with which philosophers have traditionally concerned themselves, but *dissolves* them, in that the purported difficulties involved disappear in the course of the process of analysis (4.0003, 6.5 - 6.521).

In his translation of the *Tractatus*, Father Colombo has met well the challenge of a text made difficult by technical words and terminological idiosyncrasies. The rendering of some of the main families of technical terms is explained in the notes. (The notes also give some supplementary references and provide several helpful comments and explanations.)

Father Colombo's introduction consists of seven parts, treating of Wittgenstein's life and work, the ontology of the *Tractatus*, the logical ideas that underly it, its contributions to logical positivism, the philosophical tenets reflected in the *Tractatus*, the difficulties inherent in them, and the historical significance of the *Tractatus*. The ground covered here is, upon the whole, familiar, except perhaps the discussion of the influences that underly Wittgenstein's mysticism (pp. 25-29).

It is, in my opinion, to be regretted that Father Colombo has placed stress primarily upon the role of the *Tractatus* within the development of logical positivism, rather than tracing out its kinship with Wittgenstein's own later work and its relation to the British linguistic analysis school. Wittgenstein himself came to regard the *Tractatus* in this latter light, and in the preface written in 1945 for his *Philosophical Investigations* he says:

> Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book [the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*] and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking (p. x).

However, Father Colombo gives a reason for his standpoint which I will reproduce here, as it provides insight into Italy's present philosophical scene:

> In particolare, essendo scritta per il pubblico italiano, l' "Introduzione critica" si sofferma a considerare più a lungo l'influsso del "Tractatus" nella formazione del positivismo logico del Circolo di Vienna, filosofia che, benchè tramontata da tre lustri, è la più nota in Italia come rappresentativa delle nuove tendenze e dalla quale sono stati più influenzati—almeno fino da oggi—coloro che in Italia simpatizzano per la nuova corrente (p. 8).

Father Colombo has rendered a useful service to Italian students of philosophy in placing Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*—along with much material to aid in its appreciation—at their disposal. The reviewer expresses a hope that he will go on to render a similar service in the case of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. **By Etienne Gilson. New York: Random House, 1955. Pp. xvii + 829.**

Twenty-five years ago, when he was already a mature historian of the thought of the Middle Ages, Gilson used to tell his classes that he could

not write a complete history of medieval philosophy. His students did not believe him (at least, I did not). In a sense, he was right and we were right. He would insist that, before such a history could be written, a whole series of very thorough monographs on individual thinkers and positions would have to be done. In the intervening years, Gilson has done a good many such special studies, and so have other scholars. He was right in his insistence on this preliminary work. But he also wrote several general works on the thought of the whole period. His original little work, *La Philosophie au moyen-âge,* was much enlarged during the second world war. The Gifford Lectures on the *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* served to clarify Gilson's over-all interpretation of the period, as did his *Unity of Philosophical Experience.* If, back in the 1920's, De Wulf was to complain that Gilson was neglecting medieval metaphysics and was overstressing theories of knowledge, that criticism is no longer valid. *Being and Some Philosophers* is only one of several recent works in this area.

We were right, too. Gilson has proved us so, by producing this excellent *History of Christian Philosophy.* It is a much better work than the second edition of *Philosophie au moyen-âge.* In this English book, Gilson covers the period from the early Christian apologists to Nicholas of Cusa, roughly fourteen centuries of thought. In comparison with the standard works by De Wulf and Ueberweg-Geyer, Gilson's *History* takes up fewer thinkers and concentrates on giving an understandable account of the main lines of thought. The notes and bibliographical materials (pp. 549-804) are extensive, learned, up-to-date, and extremely valuable. Two indexes are supplied, one of authors in the Middle Ages, the other of modern historians. All these features make the book useful for reference.

Anyone who has taught the history of medieval philosophy knows that things run rather smoothly up to the beginning of the thirteenth century. True, we do not know much about the twelfth century as yet, but there is little difficulty with the organization of the available materials until we come to the century of St. Thomas. In his French work on the philosophy of the Middle Ages, Gilson handled the complex of thirteenth-century thought by taking six different lines of development running through the century. This English volume provides a more sophisticated approach. After two chapters on the positions of philosophy and theology at the start of the century, Gilson now offers successive chapters on St. Albert, Roger Bacon, and mid-century logicians, the Paris Franciscans, Kilwardby and Peckham in England, St. Thomas Aquinas, Latin Averroism, the condemnations and controversies of the last decades. This new arrangment seems to be a very happy solution to a most difficult problem in organization.

Gilson's approach to his material, throughout the book, is much influenced

by his recent work on the character of Christian philosophy. He is more convinced than ever that philosophers do not work in a vacuum, that their thought cannot be wholly separated from their religious attitudes. His title is precise: This is the story of an era in *Christian* philosophy. Even when he treats the thought of the Moslems and Jews, his discussion is related to the major theme: the growth of Christian wisdom, of a philosophy ordered to Christian theology. No section illustrates this better than the pages devoted to St. Thomas Aquinas (pp. 361-83). Here, after an introductory section on the relation of philosophy to theology in St. Thomas, there follow brief expositions of St. Thomas's views on God, creation, man and his end, and Thomism at the crossways. Clearly, Gilson has avoided the Wollfian systematic divisions.

Because this book is well written, it should make good reading outside the classroom. But I should like to speak very bluntly about its place in Catholic schools. For decades, teachers in Catholic colleges and seminaries have been using out-of-date and inaccurate textbooks in the history of philosophy. To see what I mean, one has only to read what Turner says about Abelard, for instance, then read Gilson's account of Abelard, and then read Abelard himself. He will then know what to do with Turner. It will cost something—in money and in effort on the part of an older teacher—to use Gilson's text, but the eventual profit will be great.

The Mediaeval Academy of America awards annually, to an outstanding work on the Middle Ages, the Haskins medal. One wonders whether this book, combining broad scholarship with literate style, should not be seriously considered for this honor.

BEATRICE H. ZEDLER, *Marquette University*

Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). **Translated from the Arabic by Simon Van den Bergh. Oxford: Univ. Press; London: Luzac, 1954. 2 vols. Vol. I: pp. xxxvi + 374. Vol. II: pp. 219.**

After 1328 Averroes was known to European thinkers not only as The Commentator, but also as the author of a long polemical work, the *Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis.* This book was a Latin translation by Calo Calonymos of Averroes' *Tahafut Al-Tahafut.*

The present work, published under the auspices of the Gibb Memorial Trust and the International Commission for the Translation of Great Works,

gives us for the first time an English translation, directly from the Arabic, of the *Tahafut Al-Tahafut*. The translation has been based for the most part upon the edition of Father Maurice Bouyges, S.J., in his *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum*, Vol. III (Beyrouth, 1930); occasional differences in the readings are listed in the appendix to Volume I. The translator, Dr. Simon Van den Bergh, is a Dutch scholar who is perhaps best known for his translation (into German) of another work of Averroes, *The Epitome of Metaphysics*. Dr. Van den Bergh taught Arabic philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1930 to 1940 and since the war has been supervising work in that field at the University of Oxford.

The text of the present work is preceded by an introduction in which Dr. Van den Bergh gives its historical setting together with a summary of the main arguments. We are reminded that Ghazali, regarded as Islam's greatest theologian, wrote the *Tahafut Al-Falasifa* to defend religion by destroying confidence in the philosophers, who by reason alone tried to solve all problems concerning God and the world; the philosophers against whom his attack is mainly directed are Aristotle and his Moslem commentators, Avicenna and Farabi. Averroes' book, *Tahafut Al-Tahafut*, was written in answer to Ghazali's work in order to defend the philosophers. Dr. Van den Bergh indicates that the title of Ghazali's work should be rendered not by "destruction of the philosophers" but as "the disintegration or the incoherence of the philosophers." He therefore translates the title of Averroes' book as *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*.

Averroes' work includes sixteen discussions followed by a section on "the natural sciences." His procedure is to cite passages from Ghazali's *Tahafut*, then—frequently—to summarize with admirable clarity the main points of the citation, and finally to state his reasons for agreeing or, more often, for disagreeing with Ghazali. Sometimes he will point out that a philosopher's argument has been ineptly stated, or that what is given as a demonstration was never intended as such by the philosophers, or he will try to show why Ghazali is wrong in rejecting an argument. The text is often enlivened by sharp comments, as when Ghazali is accused of perplexing and confusing his readers, or of being either wicked or ignorant. More than once Averroes suggests, in exasperation, that it would be more suitable to call Ghazali's book " 'Incoherence' without qualification rather than 'The Incoherence of the Philosophers'."

The main problem of the polemic is that of the eternity of the world, but other topics discussed include emanation, the divine attributes, God's knowledge of singulars, causality, the soul, the relations of philosophy and religion. These discussions give the Western reader the opportunity to compare the real Averroes with the Averroes known to medieval Christians.

This is not to say, however, that the Averroes of *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* always presents a wholly clear and coherent position himself. He speaks, for example, of the First Cause as a cause of existence and yet in other texts this cause appears to be only an actualizer of potentiality and therefore a mover but not the Creator. Again, Averroes rejects the *ex uno, unum*-principle which underlies Avicenna's doctrine of mediate creation; yet elsewhere he himself accepts the principle and, in some form, the doctrine that the First is the cause of other things through the mediation of many causes. He speaks of the need of revelation to complete and perfect reason; yet elsewhere he thinks the reason of learned men can attain truth in its fullness while revelation hints at that same truth through images that "the masses" can grasp.

But with all these difficulties, the text of the work presents an Averroes not often glimpsed in the history of Latin Averroism. Here one sees that it was not impiety but a concern to safeguard the eternal omnipotence of God that prompted the teaching on the eternity of the world. One sees that Averroes did not deny to God a knowledge of the singular, but, fearing an anthropomorphic view of God's knowledge, attributed to Him a knowledge neither universal nor singular but transcending both. One sees him not rejecting but asserting the personal immortality of the soul (on this topic, cf. "Averroes and Immortality," *New Scholasticism*, Oct., 1954). And, whatever his motives may have been, one sees him not flaunting the differences but stressing the similarities between the views of the philosophers and the truths of religion.

Many of the difficult passages are interpreted in the notes, contained in Volume II. The notes also include references to historical sources and brief comparisons with similar views of modern philosophers. As one might expect, the works of Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Avicenna, and Ghazali are frequently cited as sources. It is of special interest to see, though, the influence that the Stoics and Skeptics have had on the thought of the Arabs. Dr. Van den Bergh believes, for example, that the fatalism and determinism often regarded as Oriental aspects of Islam are Stoic in origin. In an index, as well as in the notes, he also mentions a number of "contradictions" in Aristotle's system. While admitting ambiguity and lack of clarity in some of The Philosopher's texts, not all scholars of Aristotle would agree that every point listed is in fact a contradiction—for example, the "identification of knowledge and things known." "The sense in act is the sensible in act" may be paradoxical, but it is not contradictory when understood in the context of a metaphysics of knowledge.

The suggested similarities between views of the Arabs and modern philosophers' views are interesting. Though not attempting to establish a

historical influence here, Dr. Van den Bergh's comparisons of, for instance, arguments in the First Discussion with Kant's antinomies, Ghazali's nominalism with Berkeley's, and Ghazali and Hume on causality, help to reveal the content of the two *Tahafut's* as not a dead polemic of a bygone age but a living discussion of perennial problems.

This well-printed, well-annotated translation of the *Tahafut Al-Tahafut* is a welcome addition to the few philosophical works of the Arabs that are available in English.

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The End of Time. A Meditation on the Philosophy of History. **By Josef Pieper. Translated by Michael Bullock. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1954. Pp. 157. $2.75.**

La Fin des temps. Méditation sur la philosophie de l'histoire. **By Josef Pieper. Translated by Claire Champollion. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 201.**

A philosophical journal has to take notice of Professor Pieper's *End of Time* if for no other reason than the subtitle *Eine geschichtsphilosophische Meditation.* Yet the book is essentially a theology of history. The problem, therefore, is to find out why the author insists on calling it philosophy. Before seeking the answer in Chapter I, I shall summarize the theological message of Chapters II and III in order that it may be clearly seen what Professor Pieper considers to be the result of philosophical reflection.

Professor Pieper is concerned that we pay more attention to the Apocalypse and other divinely inspired prophecies of the end of the world. He would have us, under the sane guidance of St. Thomas Aquinas, especially in his commentary on St. Paul's Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, avoid oversimplified interpretations which might paralyze us by terror. It is true that we have to look forward to a catastrophic end of the world, a particularly human catastrophe, preceded by times of mass apostasy and the apparent triumph of evil during which the Church's role will be more than ever that of the *ecclesia martyrum.* Yet, despite the terrifying predictions and the contemporary situation, which lends them a plausibility not dreamed of in the last century, we must not despair, for Antichrist is already defeated by Christ's death; there will be a final deliverance. The true end and goal of history is a transposition from without into a new heaven and a new

earth. The Christian attitude should not be one of terror, but of quiet, realistic expectancy. The Christian is not surprised to find the twentieth century exhibiting barbaric previews of the last times. He knows that he may be called on to witness to Christian hope by martyrdom. He also knows that he may not lay down the burden and abandon the world to the forces of evil. Armed with the supernatural virtue of hope he alone has the justification for sanifying activity within history.

What has this to do with philosophy of history? Everything. A philosopher of history who turns his back on revelation will soon have nothing but superficialities to contemplate. The only real philosophy of history is one that is open to revelation and is ready to accept theological tradition as an indispensable source of information on the goal of history. In other words, the only real philosophy of history is a theology. Only Professor Pieper does not wish to say so out loud, because he wants especially the liberals to read and ponder his message.

By appealing to experience, ancient and recent, Professor Pieper has found an excellent way of introducing the Apocalypse to the liberals. Without revelation the Greeks could see no meaning to history; there was no beginning nor end, but only the immobility of recurring cycles. Without revelation, or rather by a perversion of Christian finality, the Enlightenment developed an optimism, an unlimited faith in progress, that has been mocked by two world wars, concentration camps, and iron curtains. Only revelation assures a direction to history; to ignore it is to miss the very object of any philosophy of history. Such failure must be abhorrent to the deepest desires of the liberals to do serious philosophy in this field (p. 16), to look at things in their depth and totality (p. 21), to be ill-satisfied with the merely interesting (p. 28), to be open for truth from any source, to dread leaving out any part of reality (p. 116), and, finally, to be accounted as philosophers in the grand tradition of the West (p. 20). Professor Pieper's *End of Time* is a model of the truly serious and penetrating reflection they are demanding, and it cannot be done without revelational data.

However, in attempting to show that philosophy of history needs to be theological, Professor Pieper undermines his case by exhibiting the philosophy of history as simply a more acute case of a want endemic to all philosophy. The general want he endeavors to establish from the attempts philosophers have made to understand cognition (p. 16). He does admit that they may cast some light on the nature of knowledge "even without referring back to the pre-philosophic tradition" (p. 26). But, without an ordination to theology, such inquiry is not radical (p. 26)—that is, truly philosophical—and the inner reason for the dependence of cognition on being is not given (p. 19). Why must this last problem look to theology for an

answer? Because (*a*) without theology contemporary theory either runs into a sudden block, or, right at the start, will not ask radical questions (p. 19); and (*b*) only through theology does the accessibility of being to human knowledge become fully intelligible (p. 53).

Now, possibly the pressure of sad experience may persuade a liberal to admit that the loss of theology's queenship has resulted in a superficiality of inquiry with regard to knowledge. Yet not even all Catholic philosophers would agree that only the revelation of the creation of all things by God through the Logos gives the key to the perceptibility of things. As in metaphysics (cf. Father Owens's "Intelligibility of Being," *Gregorianum*, XXXVI, 2 [1955]) only the light of our knowledge of the First Cause shows the transcendentals in their full intelligibility, so in theory of knowledge only God's causal knowledge assures us of the radical intelligibility of all things. But these are philosophic insights, and it is surely in this sense that Professor Pieper's quotation from St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Liber de Causis* is to be taken (p. 53). The context bears this out.

In commenting on Proposition 6 (cited as I, 6 in Champollion's notes; as 2, 6 in Bullock's), St. Thomas says, "ipsa actualitas rei est quoddam lumen ipsius," which appears in Bullock's translation as, "the reality of things themselves is their light." "Light" here means anything that makes a thing known. Thus the actuality of a thing may be called a sort of light, because, as Aristotle says, a thing is known through what is actual in it. St. Thomas then goes on to say that, since an effect is in act through its cause, it is illumined and known through its cause. So the first cause, being pure act, is the pure light whereby all things are rendered knowable and illumined. It is true, as Father Saffrey points out on page xxx of his edition of St. Thomas's commentary, that religious monotheism, Arab or Christian, influenced the author of the *Liber de Causis;* but I do not think that St. Thomas meant his words to bolster Professor Pieper's proposition that only the light of faith in a revealed mystery (the Logos) renders "the inmost disposition of existent things" discernible (p. 54). This comes close to denying any competency to philosophy in its own field.

Actually the whole discussion of philosophical inquiry into the nature of cognition could have been left out without prejudicing the case. It would have been enough for establishing the indigence of the philosophy of history to have shown that, since history is essentially concerned with free decisions, no inquiry based on experience alone can say anything certain about free beginnings or ends.

Apart from what I consider the above weak example, Professor Pieper is always skillful in adapting his material to the liberal mentality. He is well aware, for instance, of its disdain for revelation as an escape from thinking,

a substitute for the hard work of search for truth. In answer he shows how the Christian thinker's task is made harder by recourse to theology; it is the philosophy of progress which is oversimple, as also is that of radical pessimism (p. 31). The formal structure of the Christian's attitude to the end of the world is far too complex to be tagged either optimism or pessimism (p. 83).

From Professor Pieper's analysis one can see that neither an affirmative nor a negative could be given to the question recently put to Professor Toynbee: "Are you an optimist or pessimist about the future of Western civilization?" (*New York Times Magazine*, February 20, 1955). Toynbee gives a qualified affirmative, but without the depth of perspective shown by Pieper (p. 117). Christopher Dawson, for all the pessimism attributed to him by Pieper (p. 73), would, according to his views expressed in a recent article, "Hope and Culture: Christian Culture as a Culture of Hope" (*Lumen Vitae*, IX, 3 [1954] 425-30), agree with Pieper that, if Western civilization survives, it will be because of the influence of supernatural hope. And, if it fails, the meaning of history has not been frustrated, for Christian hope is directed to a goal outside of history. The paradox is, as Dawson reminds us, that Christianity, not expecting any limitless material progress, has revitalized decaying civilizations by looking beyond them. Perhaps it will do so again for Western civilization; God alone knows. Our task is to live and act in the strength of that supernatural hope.

The theologian can learn much from *The End of Time*. Its author expresses well the need of theologians for a philosophical outlook (p. 143, note 12). He is also perfectly right in deploring a lack of philosophical earnestness in some commentators on the Apocalypse (p. 41).

The conclusion of this stimulating book is that without revealed truth there is not only no philosophy of history but also no effective living within history.

The English edition contains an index, the French none. Both editions have a distracting habit of proliferating quotation marks. But there is no need, in English at least, for appearing to apologize for phrases like "the present" (p. 13), "leading up to" (p. 14), "in any case" (p. 15), to give but a few examples from Mr. Bullock's translation.

The French translation is more intelligible than the English. I suspect that Mr. Bullock is not as familiar with philosophy as Mlle. Champollion. Where she says *intuition* he puts *divination* (p. 16). He seems to miss the point entirely by constantly speaking of the *association* of philosophy with theology, whereas the French makes it clear that *ordination* of philosophy to theology is meant. The discrepancy between his "are believed to have been revealed" and her "sont crues en tant que vérités révélées" is not in his

favor. Neither does his loose use of *inconceivable* for *unattainable*, or *intelligible* for *decipherable* serve to clarify the thought. It is unfortunate that Mr. Bullock's literary rendition sometimes obscures the meaning, for the book deserves as wide a reading as possible. As I have not seen the German original, I cannot pass judgment on the translations as such, though one gets the impression that the French is more technically accurate.

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The Sophists. **By Mario Untersteiner. Tr. from the Italian by Kathleen Freeman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xvi + 368.**

The author of *Le Origini della Tragedia* and *La Fisiologia del Mito* has undertaken in this book to assemble all of the available evidence concerning the Sophists and to reconstruct and reinterpret their doctrines. The lives, doctrines, and works of Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Antiphon, Hippias, Thrasymachus, Critias, Callicles, Lycophron, and Alcidamas are considered. The aim is a rehabilitation of the philosophical reputation of these long maligned thinkers. The present volume, originally published in Italian in 1948, is intended only as the second part of "a complete reconstruction of Sophistic." *La Fisiologia del Mito*, which appeared in 1946, is regarded by Untersteiner as the first part of this enterprise, and a third volume on the cultural aspects of Sophistic is promised. *The Sophists* now appears in English in an excellent translation by Kathleen Freeman, the translator of the pre-Socratic fragments in Diels and herself a scholar who has made substantial contributions in this field.

Kathleen Freeman's sponsorship of the book should be enough to insure its being given a serious and respectful hearing. Moreover, the book itself gives abundant evidence of Untersteiner's acquaintance with all of the important ancient sources of biographical and doxographical information about the Sophists, as well as his familiarity with the results of modern research. Some of those ancient sources Untersteiner believes himself to have discovered and used in connection with the Sophists for the first time. In addition, Untersteiner brings to his task of reconstruction and reinterpretation the resources of a rather original mind and an active, unfettered imagination, all of which keeps his work from the dullness of pedantry. And yet, with all of these real positive advantages and virtues, it must be said that the results in this book of the meeting of Untersteiner's mind with his carefully collected research materials are little short of catastrophic.

With the exception of a recent German work purporting to prove that Theophrastus wrote Aristotle, and vice versa, I cannot think of any adventure in the "higher criticism" as applied to ancient philosophy which better illustrates the dangers and pitfalls of this sort of scholarship.

The story of the scientist who reconstructs a dinosaur given only one small bone to start with, plus unlimited amounts of plaster of Paris, is familiar to all of us. Assuming enough already existing reliable information about the skeletal structure and proportions of dinosaurs, or at least of similar mammals, such a feat might be something more than a free exercise of the creative imagination. Our knowledge of the doctrinal positions and writings of the Sophists is fragmentary in the extreme, but Untersteiner does not hesitate to fill in any and all gaps in our knowledge with conjectures which are, once made, thereafter confidently assumed by him to be solid and demonstrated fact. It is not surprising, given such a method, that the theories ascribed to the ancient Sophists bear curious resemblances to Untersteiner's own philosophical opinions, as developed in his books on tragedy and myth. Nor is it surprising that Untersteiner, in order to fill in the lacunae in the Sophistic fragments, will rob Peter to pay Paul—in this case, plundering the works of Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Theophrastus, Sextus Empiricus, and even Cicero of wealth which is assumed to have originally belonged to the Sophists. The Sophists are also supposed to have consciously employed a kind of Hegelian dialectic, by which a new and resolving synthesis triumphantly surmounts contradictions. In spite of deceptive appearances, and the spiteful, jealous calumnies of Plato, the Sophists are depicted as really being paragons of humanitarian liberalism and democracy. Their claims of universal wisdom, which Socrates and Plato ridiculed, are accepted by Untersteiner at face value. We learn—upon what evidence?—that Thrasymachus really did not believe that justice was the interest of the stronger but meant only to point out, with sorrow, that this was the way foolish and evil men pervert justice. We also discover that the Sophistic art of "making the weaker appear the stronger argument" was really intended as a process of progressively humanizing moral decisions until the goal of a universally valid morality might be reached. Prodicus's science of synonyms, which appears so often in Plato as a kind of game of verbal quibbling, is, according to Untersteiner, "the scientific expression of a factor in the history of humanity," involving a dialectical resolution of *nomos* and *physis*. In the case of Lycophron, for whom we have only five short sentences in the fragments of Diels, none of them very illuminating, Untersteiner solemnly informs us (p. 340) that this thinker makes us "aware of a large humanity, which makes every effort to conceive of a brotherhood among men, even though he declares that

the method of self-coercion in this sense cannot impose a universally felt human sentiment." Leaving aside the question of precisely what Lycophron is known to have said that makes us aware of a large humanity, where does Lycophron make the remark attributed to him about self-coercion? Not one of the five fragmentary sentences in Diels even remotely says anything of the sort. Examples of this sort of free invention in Untersteiner could be multiplied; on almost every page we are told similar things about the Sophists which seem to lack all foundation in the admittedly genuine textual fragments.

There is, in addition, a practice which this reader found extremely annoying, although Untersteiner is by no means the only offender in modern scholarship. In his very copious use of quotations, from both ancient and modern sources, Untersteiner hardly ever tells his reader in the body of the text exactly *who* is talking. With difficulty it is sometimes possible (but not always) to leaf through the fine print in the footnotes at the end of each chapter and painfully acquire this information.

This is not a book which librarians should classify as non-fiction.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

Augustinus Magister. **Congrès International Augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre, 1954. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1955. Pp. 495.**

This is the third volume of the proceedings of the Congress on Augustine Studies held in Paris in 1954. Volumes I and II were printed before the meeting and contain most of the papers discussed at the sessions. The present work summarizes the discussions and prints about fifteen communications received after the first volumes had gone to press.

Quite diverse fields of research associated with St. Augustine of Hippo are covered in this work: literary and philological problems, sources, monasticism, mysticism, psychology, theories of history, various branches of theology, biblical studies, and the later influence of St. Augustine. Most reports are in French, though German, Italian, and Spanish contributions appear. Some three hundred scholars attended, representing many countries and testifying to the remarkable vogue of Augustinian studies today.

The present review will center on the papers and discussions which were of philosophical interest. By way of general comment: this congress was conducted according to a novel plan. Since most papers were printed before the meeting, the writers did not present their communications orally.

Rather, all sessions were plenary and at each a designated reporter gave a brief oral summation of all papers dealing with a specific phase of study. Thus Mlle. C. Mohrmann digested about twenty philological papers at the first session. Discussion followed from the floor. Such procedure has much to recommend it. Human nature being deprived of some of the higher graces of prudence, as Augustine knew, some of the reporters gave more time to their own views than to the papers to be digested.

On the philosophical sources of Augustine's thought, agreement was very general that Plotinus takes first place. It could hardly be otherwise, in view of the active participation of such "augustiniens plotinisants" as P. Courcelle, P. Henry, S.J., A. Pincherle, and E. von Ivanka. Porphyry and Plato were admitted as the next most obvious sources. F. Chatillon made a strong bid for Origen but the discussion turned against this suggestion. Incidentally, Courcelle's findings on St. Ambrose as a medium of Plotinian influence appear to be generally accepted as proved.

Msgr. Régis Jolivet wrote the general report on thirteen papers grouped under the heading of *Man and Knowledge*. In this session most of the discussion was pertinent to philosophy. Professor Lachièze-Rey argued that St. Augustine's theory of perception is more like Kant's than Bergson's. Several other papers dealt with the methodology of Augustinian psychology and anthropology. As usual, the theory of illumination was discussed from all angles. Readers will find a very concise survey of recent interpretations, from pages 177 to 185. The views of St. Bonaventure, Malebranche, Hessen, Gilson, Cayré, Kaelin, Boyer, Warnach, Somers, Gardeil, and many others are covered. Much attention was paid to a study by R. Allers which suggested that illumination is no longer of anything but historical interest. Gilson's position, that the light-theory is very largely a metaphor, was associated with this negative conclusion. Father Boyer still thinks that St. Thomas understood the theory very well and that the *lumen* is to be identified with each man's intelligence. V. Lossky claimed that illumination is really very simple but has been obscured by the concept of the supernatural. Canon Van Steenberghen insisted that illumination is a very complicated doctrine. He was impressed by Aller's views. The upshot of it all is that we still do not know what St. Augustine meant by divine illumination. There is, apparently, an old Russian book by J. Popofv which explains it, but Professor Lossky did not reveal the explanation.

One other session had some bearing on philosophical study, for it was concerned with the problem of mysticism and St. Augustine. To settle the question whether Augustine was in any sense a mystic, one must define mysticism, as the reporter, M. Mandouze, repeatedly pointed out. The German participants tended to deny mystical experience to St. Augustine,

because they make a radical opposition between all intellectual experience and *Gefühlsmystik*. The outstanding advocate of this view is Father E. Hendrikx, O.E.S.A., (*Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik*, 1936) but Hans Meyer took the same position at this congress. Father Boyer's comment on this seems to me the best thing in the whole discussion: "M. Meyer opposes intellectualism and mysticism. I say, if we grant this, then even the intuitive vision in heaven will not be mystical? In that case, I wonder what mysticism is." Father Boyer need not have been so disturbed; perhaps St. Augustine was not a *Gefühlsmystiker*.

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